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Abstract 
 
An innovative approach to quantify interest rate sensitivities of emerging market corporates 
is proposed. Our focus is centered at price sensitivity of modeled investment grade and high 
yield portfolios to changes in the present value of modeled portfolios composed of safe-haven 
assets, which define risk-free interest rates.  Our methodology is based on blended yield 
indexes. Modeled investment horizons are always kept above one year thus allowing to derive 
empirical implications for practical strategies of interest rate risk management in the banking 
book. As our study spans over the period 2002 – 2015, it covers interest rate sensitivity of 
assets under the pre-crisis, crisis, and post-crisis phases of the economic cycles. We 
demonstrate that the emerging market corporate bonds both, investment grade and high yield 
types, depending on the phase of a business cycle exhibit diverse regimes of sensitivity to 
interest rate changes. We observe switching from a direct positive sensitivity under the 
normal pre-crisis market conditions to an inverted negative sensitivity during distressed 
turmoil of the recent financial crisis, and than back to direct positive but weaker sensitivity 
under new normal post-crisis conjuncture. Our unusual blended yield-based approach allows 
us to present theoretical explanations of such phenomena from economics point of view and 
helps us to solve an old controversy regarding positive or negative responses of credit spreads 
to interest rates. We present numerical quantification of sensitivities, which corroborate with 
our conclusion that hedging of interest rate risk ought to be a dynamic process linked to the 
phases of business cycles as we evidence a binary-like behavior of interest rate sensitivities 
along the economic time. Our findings allow banks and financial institutions for approaching 
downside risk management and optimizing economic capital under Basel III regulatory 
capital rules.   
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1. Introduction 
 
 
The likelihood that the U.S. Federal Reserve starts gradually raising interest rates exercises 
unprecedented pressure on the whole global financial system. As interest rates are about to 
recover from historically low levels they place significant strain on bank profitability and 
capital adequacy levels. A volume of recent scientific research addressing effects of interest 
rate changes on bank performance and solvency keeps growing. See, for example Berends et 
al (2013), Landier et al (2013), Bessis (2015), Fuerst et al (2015), Haddad (2015), Neal et al 
(2015), Dupoyet et al (2016), Gubareva and Borges (2016), and references therein.  
 
The regulatory bodies also try to create the widespread awareness of possible negative 
impacts of interest rate changes on bank balance sheets and profitability. For instance, the 
Basel Committee on Banking Supervision in April of this year issued “Standards for Interest 
Rate Risk in the Banking Book” (2016). On the other hand about a year before the European 
Banking Authority (EBA) published “Guidelines on the management of interest rate risk 
arising from non-trading activities” (2015). The guidance provided in these updated 
guidelines applies to the interest rate risk arising from non-trading activities (IRRBB). This 
detailed guidance focuses thematically on five areas of interest risk assessment and control: 
scenarios and stress testing, measurement assumptions, methods for measuring interest rate 
risk, governance and identification of interest rate risk, and calculation and allocation of 
capital to interest rate risk.  
 
The above mentioned documents by the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision and by 
the EBA comprehensively outline the possible effects of interest rate increases, including 
changes to net interest margins, balance sheet structure, and values of interest-sensitive assets 
and liabilities. At this point it becomes especially important to correctly assess an interest 
rate sensitivity of assets, which is a measure of how much the price of a fixed-income asset 
will fluctuate as a result of changes in the interest rate environment. The more the price 
fluctuates, the more sensitive to interest rate is the asset.  
 
But what is really important for managing IRRBB is how the prices of assets react on medium 
term downward or upward trends in interest rate dynamics. Nevertheless, the interest rate 
sensitivity of corporate debt is traditionally analyzed in terms of yield sensitivity of corporate 
bonds to changes in the yield curve of risk-free assets, see Manzoni (2002), Landschoot 
(2008), Boulkeroua and Stark (2010 and 2013), and references therein. In this context, 
impacts in asset prices are obfuscated as researchers main interests are centered on interest 
rate – credit spread relationship, and not on final impacts in present value of risky securities.  
 
Another important aspect of our research is that we assess the price response from the 
perspective of medium term investment in the banking book. Thus we are interested in 
interrelations between changes in present value of risky and risk-free assets over a 
considerably long periods; 1-, 2- and 3-year long. This explains the novelty of our approach 
 3
as opposed to the studies of daily changes in interest rates and credit spreads, which employ 
averaging of daily statistics over extended time intervals in order to come out with a kind of 
average sensitivities. We show that our results contrast with many quantitative and qualitative 
findings of previous research, see Boulkeroua and Stark (2010 and 2013), Neal et al (2015), 
and Dupoyet et al (2016, among others.  
 
As to theoretical interpretations of interest rate – credit spread relationship, among the 
cornerstone studies in this field we mention the Merton (1974) structural model, which 
implies a negative response of credit spreads to interest rates, i.e. it means that the probability 
of default is affected by changes in the interest rate. We also cite the other side of the 
theoretical divide that advocates a positive relationship between changes in yield spreads and 
changes in the risk-free rate, see Kamin and Kleist (1999). This Merton (1974) versus Kamin 
and Kliest (1999) controversy had attracted our attention both from the theoretical and 
empirical points of view as there were lots of empirical observations fitting each of the 
models. Thus, studying interest rate sensitivities we decided to undertake further research 
seeking to solve the above controversy. 
 
Hence, our attempts to advance a theoretical interpretation of interest rate – credit spread 
relationship is quite timely, as most of recent research in this field is focused on empirical 
side of the problem. We emphasize the works of Kamin and Kliest (1999), Davies (2008), 
Boulkeroua and Stark (2010 and 2013), Neal et al (2015), and Dupoyet et al (2016). It is also 
worth noting that research in this area has been mostly focusing at the U.S. domestic bond 
market. The fact that U.S. domestic financial market for government and corporate bonds is 
the biggest in the world explains its attraction for researchers involved in empirical 
investigations of the relationship between the yield spread on corporate bonds and changes 
in the yield of U.S. government bonds, see Piazzesi and Schneider (2010), Bauer and 
Hamilton (2015), Begenau et al (2015), etc.  
 
Differently to the cited above works our research addresses the EM corporate debt. Note that 
the importance of non-U.S. financial markets keeps growing; see Mishkin and Eakins (2015). 
For example, the level of corporate debt in EM had quadrupled between 2004 and 2014. In 
respect to the non-U.S. markets, we would like to mention the already cited study of the 
evolution and determinants of emerging market credit spreads performed Kamin and Kleist 
(1999) and the previously cited research of Manzoni (2002) who studied the behavior of yield 
spreads on an ISMA Sterling Eurobond Index composed by bonds from different markets 
including Latin America, etc. As such studies are rather rare, additional research into non-
U.S. corporate is highly desirable.  
 
Having a slightly different perspective and focusing on sensitivity of EM asset prices to risk-
free interest rates, here we go beyond the interest rate and credit spreads dynamics. In our 
work, we analyze the interest rate sensitivity as a price sensitivity of a chosen portfolio 
composed by EM corporate bonds to changes in the prices of U.S. Treasury bonds, which 
determine changes in the risk-free interest rates. We consider two different cases when the 
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EM bond portfolio is either hedged by short positions in U.S. Treasury bonds or not. This 
work also contributes to the research on interdependence between the credit risk, interest rate 
risk, and liquidity risks, being related to downside risk management and financial stability 
improvement; see Gubareva (2014), Gubareva and Borges (2014), and Gubareva and Borges 
(2016).  
 
And last but not least, this paper aims to contribute by providing answers to the following 
chief question: does it make an economic sense to hedge interest risk of U.S. dollar 
denominated EM corporate debt by short positions in U.S. Treasury bonds or by pay-fixed 
receive-float interest rate swaps? We try to respond this question separately for EM 
investment grade (IG) and EM high yield (HY) corporates. The answers to these questions 
are of particular importance for interest rate risk management and for dimensioning economic 
capital to allocate for mitigating this type of risk. Hence our research is potentially important 
not only for academia community, but also to financial industry players and regulatory 
bodies.  
   
This paper is structured as follows. Section 2 describes the data and details the scope of our 
studies. Section 3 introduces the methodology and assumptions developed for analyses of 
asset prices´ volatility. Section 4 presents empirical results. Section 5 provides discussions 
and illustrations of the implications of the obtained results, and Section 6 offers concluding 
remarks.  
 
 
2. Empirical Data and Scope 
 
Being rather interested in aggregate interest rate hedge techniques at a portfolio level and not 
focusing on a cherry-picking performance of certain selected assets, we opt to study an IR 
sensitivity of the EM portfolios prices. Our approach is based on yield indices describing EM 
corporate debt performance. After careful studies of existing indices our choice was to use 
two J.P. Morgan Corporate Emerging Market Bond Indices: the Broad High Grade Blended 
Yield (Bloomberg ticker JBBYIGIG) and the Broad High Yield Blended Yield (Bloomberg 
ticker JBBYNOIG). As one could infer from the tickers´ abbreviations, the former presents 
a blended yield for Investment Grade bonds while the latter offers a blended yield for Non-
Investment Grade instruments.  
 
The blended high yield emerging market corporate bond index (JBBYNOIG) is a rule based 
index engineered to measure speculative grade corporate bond performance of USD 
denominated fixed-rate corporate bonds of issuers in emerging markets as defined by J.P. 
Morgan. This index is calculated using quite a widespread universe of emerging market 
corporate debt. Over four hundred corporate bonds issued by over two hundred issuers from 
over forty emerging market countries contribute to the blended yield index calculations. 
Similarly, the blended high grade emerging market corporate bond index (JBBYIGIG) is also 
a rule-based index engineered to measure investment grade corporate bond performance of 
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USD denominated fixed-rate corporate bonds of issuers in emerging markets. Its issue, issuer 
and geography coverage is similar to the one described above.  
 
These two indexes JBBYIGIG and JBBYNOIG provide more than 14-year long historical 
yield series, starting at December 31, 2001, which represent a considerable time interval for 
studying EM debt performance in the twenty first century. In our research the final date of 
analyzed data is put to be December 31, 2015. Of course for analyzing a dynamics of asset 
values and portfolios prices, the price index perhaps would be a better choice, but to the best 
of our knowledge no price indexes with similar issuer, geography and historic coverage are 
available in the market. Thus, instead of researching an individual bond price histories and/or 
developing a range of bond price indexes from a selected universe of individual bond data 
we opt for using the two above mentioned yield indexes to measure high grade and high yield 
EM corporate debt performance.  
 
As the main focus of our research is to analyze asset price changes we rule out total return 
indexes as well, as the reinvestment of the net interest income proceeds does not enter the 
scope of the present research.   
 
Being interested in a dynamics of changes in present value of modeled portfolios hedged 
against interest rate risk, we model the basic interest rate risk hedge as a holding of short 
positions in US Treasuries with the five year maturity similar to the maturity of the above 
mentioned blended yield indexes.  To describe the price dynamics of the interest rate risk 
hedge we employ the US Global Generic rate index available through the Bloomberg 
terminal under the USGG5YR ticker whose maturity is equivalent to the maturity of the two 
bond indices being analyzed. 
 
The next section describes the methodology allowing for comprehensive analysis of EM 
corporate bond portfolios based on the time series of the broad blended yield indexes, along 
with our approach to tackle interest rate risk hedge based on shorting US Treasury bonds, 
relied on the US Global Generic rate historical series. 
 
 
3. Methodology 
 
The basis element of our yield-based framework is a conversion of the available index value 
of the blended yield into the average price of the modeled portfolios, namely EM IG portfolio 
and EM HY portfolio, in accordance with the employed index, JBBYIGIG and JBBYNOIG, 
respectively. We start our explanation with an example of just one bond.  
 
 
A cash flow received in n-years should be discounted at the n-year interest rate. Combining 
cash flows in different years leads us to a general formula for the present value of a cash flow 
stream:  
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ܲ ൌ ෍ ܥܨ௡ሺ1 ൅ ݕ௡ሻ௡
ே
௡ୀଵ
 
            (1) 
Then, this formula could be simplified for a 5-year bond with annual coupon c and face value 
p. The price P of this bond could be written as 
 
   ܲ ൌ 	 ௖ଵା௬ ൅
௖
ሺଵା௬ሻమ ൅
௖
ሺଵା௬ሻయ ൅
௖
ሺଵା௬ሻర ൅
௖ା௣
ሺଵା௬ሻఱ   (2) 
 
where y is a market interest rate for the level of riskiness associated with the bond under 
analyses. Here, for simplicity reasons we assume a term structure of bond yield to be flat. 
When the bond coupon c is equal to the yield y the bond is issued at par.  
 
However a blended yield index provides us only with time series of yield value y. So we do 
not have any actionable information on the subjacent bonds coupon values. So, at this point 
one needs an assumption which would permit to overcome this lack of information in order 
to find an average price of a modeled portfolio. Thus we assume a continuous rebalancing of 
the portfolio. This assumption if frequently used to study risk minimization strategies for 
portfolio immunization, see for instance Fong and Vasicek (2015). 
 
In our case the assumption which is even more important than the assumption of the 
continuous portfolio rebalancing is the assumption of a “cruising speed” rebalancing or 
constant rate rebalancing of the portfolio. This assumption means that a bond entering the 
model portfolio stays in the portfolio for a certain holding period, say n years, and by the end 
of this period the bond is sold out. We assume that all bonds in the modeled portfolio 
represent equal weights. Fig. 1 schematically represents the rebalancing of the modeled 
portfolio consisting at any moment in time of four bonds with the identic face value. In our 
schematic example the “continuous” rebalancing is represented by quarterly rebalancing. A 
lifetimes of the consecutively issues bond are presented as horizontal lanes.  
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Figure 1. Continuous rebalancing of the hypothetical four-bond portfolio with a complete 
renewal of assets during one year interval  
 
As could be seen from Figure 1, we assume that the bonds are regularly issued once a quarter. 
While issued a new on-the-run security has initial maturity of five years and a half. The newly 
issued bond become a part of the portfolio, and spends in portfolio a period of time, which 
we call bond holding period. In our example such bond holding period equals one year. A 
bond which spent one year in the portfolio, so-called off-the-run security with residual 
maturity of 4,5 years, is substituted by a newly issued on-the-run bond. In this example the 
average residual maturity of the portfolio is always equal to five years, the point of term 
structure which we are interested in in our research.  
 
The example above could be easily generalized for a situation when a bond holding period 
may equal n years, or 260*n banking days. As the vast majority of bonds are issued at par, 
this gives us a key to finding an average coupon of the modeled portfolio at the date d as an 
average of the index yield daily values observed over the n years prior to this date d.    
 
ܿ ൌ 1݊ ∗ 260 ෍ ݕ௜
௡∗ଶ଺଴
௜ୀଵ
 
       (3) 
 
Here we consider that the year consists of 260 working days for which index data are 
available. During this study we employed three different holding periods n of 1, 2, and 3 
years. The choice of this time intervals will be discussed in more detail further in the text.  
 
Our research performs modeling of the two portfolios namely, EM IG and EM HY portfolios, 
as described by the JBBYIGIG and JBBYNOIG indexes, respectively. So now we are able 
to price each of these two model portfolios at any date covered by the employed JBBYIGIG 
and JBBYNOIG historical series. The more precisely is to say that for 1 year holding period 
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the time window of reconstructed portfolio prices is 2003-2015, for 2 year holding period – 
2004-2013, and for 3 year holding period – 2005-2015. The time intervals differ as in order 
to calculate the average coupon for a chosen portfolio the appropriate rebalancing speed must 
be chosen. In other words, the time extension of the yield averaging window is set equal to 
the length of the respective bond holding period.  
   
The possibility to have historical price series for the two, IG and HY EM model portfolios 
enables us to quantify asset value appreciation/depreciation occurred in the respective 
modeled portfolios over any chosen period of time as the difference between portfolio prices 
subjacent to the two chosen dates: 
 
߂௉_ாெሺݐ, ܪሻ ൌ ாܲெሺݐ ൅ ܪሻ െ ாܲெሺݐሻ   (4) 
 
where H stands for a time horizon over which the impact in price is analyzed.  
 
The same approach is also applied for analyzing price changes of the short positions in US 
Treasuries performing the role of hedge instruments while the performance of the EM 
portfolios hedged against interest-rate risk is studied. So, for the long positions in US 
treasuries we have straight away: 
 
߂௉_௎ௌ்_௅ைேீሺݐ, ܪሻ ൌ ௎ܲௌ்_௅ைேீሺݐ ൅ ܪሻ െ ௎ܲௌ்_௅ைேீሺݐሻ  (5) 
 
while dealing with the short positions we just invert the signs in the right hand side of the 
equation (5):  
 
߂௉_௎ௌ்_ௌுைோ்ሺݐ, ܪሻ ൌ ௎ܲௌ்ಽೀಿಸሺݐሻ െ 	 ௎ܲௌ்_௅ைேீሺݐ ൅ ܪሻ  (6) 
  
It is worth noticing that we are interested in price changes over rather extended time intervals. 
Herein we analyze a variety of the rebalancing rates, i.e., bond holding periods, being 
combined with the several lengths of time horizons over which the changes in value of the 
modeled portfolios are analyzed. Table 1 below presents our selection: 
 
 
 
Bond 
Holding 
Period
Portfolio 
Impact 
Horizon
Available 
price history 
window
Available 
window of 
price changes 
1Y 1Y 2003-2015 2004-2015
2Y 1Y 2004-2015 2005-2015
2Y 2Y 2004-2015 2006-2015
3Y 1Y 2005-2015 2006-2015
3Y 2Y 2005-2015 2007-2015
3Y 3Y 2005-2015 2008-2015
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Table 1. Available windows of price changes for diverse bond holding periods and portfolio 
impact horizons. 
 
 
For the presented above available windows of price changes we analyze performance of the 
pure asset sides of the EM IG and HY portfolios, interest rate sensitivity of assets, the 
efficiency of hedge, downside risk exposures of hedged and unhedged portfolios as well as 
the respective upsides.  
 
The downside risk of the portfolio we define as the most negative move in the price of the 
portfolio, being it hedged or unhedged 
 
 ܦ݋ݓ݊ݏ݅݀݁ ൌ 	 	݉݅݊௧ ߂௉ሺݐ, ܪሻ,                (6) 
 
while the upside we define, just in the opposite manner, as a maximum gain over an analyzed 
period:  
 
ܷ݌ݏ݅݀݁ ൌ 	 	݉ܽݔ௧ ߂௉ሺݐ, ܪሻ,                  (7)
  
The meaning of all these metrics we will discuss in more detail in the next sections dedicated 
to the empiric results obtained by our approach and the discussion of their implications. 
 
As we are interested in price-wise interest rate sensitivity, we try to simplify our model and 
eliminate less important details. For instance, continuous rebalancing involves continuous 
buying and selling assets. Nonetheless we exclude transaction expenses and gains as in fact 
they respectively represent the out-of-pocket and into-the-pocket money, which do not affect 
present value of future cash flows of assets composing our modeled portfolios.  
 
 
4. Empiric results 
 
4.1. Visual and Correlation analyses of the two EM corporate bond indices. 
 
Figures 2 and 3 present the historical series of the yields in bps as per JBBYIGIG and 
JBBYNOIG indexes, respectively. For the sake of visual comparison and spread visualization 
these series are plotted along with the US Global Generic rate as per USGG5YR index. 
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Figure 2. Blended bond yield of EM IG corporates vs. US Global Generic rate. 
Source: Bloomberg 
 
 
 
Figure 3. Blended bond yield of EM HY corporates vs. US Global Generic rate. 
Source: Bloomberg 
 
Both charts depict a substantial widening of IG and HY bond spreads over risk-free rates in 
2008 and 2009 corresponding to the gigantic flight-to-quality effect coinciding with the 
apogee of the global financial crisis. After the crisis the yields of risky and risk-free assets 
visually appear to move on parallel courses, creating a visual impression that during the six 
recent years the short position in UST would be a good hedge for EM portfolios. As we show 
later on, the problem here is that even under such circumstances the hedge efficiency could 
be rather questionable, as what counts at the end is the difference between the price changes 
0
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of the portfolios composed, on one hand, of risky assets and, on the other hand, of risk-free 
securities while these changes are verified over the time horizon chosen to analyze asset value 
appreciation/depreciation.  
 
But prior to the analysis of price changes, we present a correlation study. Fig.4 and Fig.5 
depict a behavior of Pearson coefficient for 120 days long arrays of movements in the yields 
of risky and risk-free assets.   
  
 
Figure 4. Correlation between yields of EM IG bonds and US Global Generic rates. 
 
 
 
Figure 5. Correlation between yields of EM HY bonds and US Global Generic rates. 
 
A visual comparative analysis of this two charts permits to conclude that moves in the yields 
of EM IG bonds are significantly more correlated to the moves in the rates of the risk-free 
assets than the yields of EM HY bonds. At least, the correlation coefficient for EM IG bonds 
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never exhibits negative values, while the correlation coefficient for EM HY bonds almost 
half of the time stays in the negative territory, the evidencing contrarian behavior of the yields 
of speculative grade securities in respect to the UST yields. Mean values of 0,526 and 0,021 
for the IG and HY bonds, respectively, averaged over the available data history also 
corroborate with stated above. The average value of the correlation coefficient for EM HY 
bonds very closed to zero certifies, in a long run, a practically full absence of correlation 
between the yields of HY EM corporates and the UST over long enough time intervals.  
 
Nevertheless this simplistic correlation approach and the presented figures do not really tell 
as the whole story, as more detailed analysis in terms of asset price changes presented further 
sections reveals the more complex nature of the interest rate sensitivity. We undertake the 
more advanced studies by quantifying the impacts of the yield dynamics on the present values 
of modeled portfolios occurred over diverse time horizons under several assumptions 
regarding the cruising speed, i.e., the rate of rebalancing or renewal of the portfolio. For that 
reason, we use the yield data to recalculate price histories for the selected portfolios 
composed of IG and HY EM corporate securities.     
 
 
4.2. Modeled portfolio prices 
 
In this subsection we present our calculations of the historic prices for the model portfolios 
under the selected assumptions regarding the time interval along which the modeled portfolio 
is completely renewed, namely of 1, 2, and 3 years. We consider the face value of the 
portfolio to be equal to 1000 million USD. Fig. 6 represents the price dynamics of the 3 EM 
IG bond portfolios with the respective bond holding periods equal to the discussed above 
time intervals.   
 
 
 
Figure 6. Prices of the EM IG bond portfolios with different bond holding periods. 
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As it appears from the comparative analysis of the price plots the price behaviors appears to 
be quite similar prior to the apogee of the global financial crisis at the end of 2008 and during 
the last three years. Still during the recovery phase one could observe major differences in 
the price behaviors. For the portfolio undergoing a complete renewal along 1 year rebalancing 
period the price bottom is not so deep as for the other portfolios while the major upside in 
prices occurs within 1Y after the bottom is reached. For the portfolios with the bond holding 
periods of 2 and 3 years the recovery spikes are not so sharp occurring over the respective 2 
to 3 year long periods. 
 
Fig. 7 represents the price dynamics of the 3 EM HY bond portfolios with the bond holding 
periods equal to 1, 2, and 3 years.   
 
 
Figure 7. Prices of the EM HY bond portfolios with different bond holding periods. 
 
These plots of the HY bond portfolio prices corroborate with our conclusions regarding the 
price recovery dynamics as a function of the bond holding period, which we obtained from 
the analysis of the Fig. 6 depicting prices of IG bond portfolios over the same period. It is 
worth noting that as expected we observe that the financial crisis influence on the price 
behavior of the modeled HY portfolio is stronger than on the price behavior of the modeled 
IG portfolios.  
 
Fig. 8 represents the price dynamics of the 3 UST long portfolios with the securities holding 
periods equal to 1, 2, and 3 years.   
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Figure 8. Prices of the UST long portfolios with different bond holding periods. 
 
Comparing the price behavior of the risk-free UST portfolios and the risky EM portfolios one 
could conclude that the global financial crises represented a huge flight-to-quality event when 
the prices of safe assets increased and the EM bonds decreased. On the other hand the range 
of UST price changes (roughly -5%/+15%, see Fig.8) is narrower than the range of price 
changes both, for the IG EM corporate bonds (roughly -20%/+10%, see Fig.6) and HY EM 
corporate bonds (roughly -40%/+20%, see Fig.7).  
 
 
4.3. Modeled historic price series 
 
In this section we study dynamics of the historic series of the annual, biannual, and triennial   
changes is value of assets composing the EM and UST bond portfolios. The calculations are 
performed on a daily basis. We also construct the historic price series for the EM portfolios 
hedged by the short positions in the US Treasuries. The time spans of the series are limited 
due to the availability of data and depend on the rebalancing speed selected for the portfolio 
modeling as well as on the time horizon of the studied impacts. 
 
 
4.3.1. EM IG corporate bond portfolios  
 
 
Figure 9 represents the time behavior of the 1-year changes in value of the model EM IG 
corporate bond portfolio and in the risk-free UST bond portfolio, with the rebalancing rate 
of the portfolios equal to 1 year.  
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Figure 9. 1-year price changes for the EM IG and UST portfolios with 1-year bond holding 
period.   
 
How to read this chart? The points plotted for December 31, 2003, represent changes in the 
values of the portfolios occurred over the 1 year started December 31, 2002. One clearly 
observes that during the period prior and after the apogee of the global financial crises, in 
this case along 2007 – 2012, the changes in the portfolio values are in an opposite mode. 
 
Hence, under the above mentioned assumptions regarding the portfolio strategy, i.e., 1-year 
long horizon to measure portfolio results and 1-year stay of the bonds in the portfolio, – the 
hedging of the EM IG portfolio with the short UST positions do not compensate the negative 
impacts, during the periods when such setoff is the most needed. Fig 10 shows the time 
behavior of the 1-year changes in value of the model EM IG corporate bond portfolio hedged 
by the short positions in UST bonds, under the assumption of the complete portfolio 
rebalancing over 1-year time interval. 
 
 
Figure 10. 1-year price changes for the EM IG long + UST short portfolio rebalancing over 
1 year  
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As we could see by comparing Figures 9 and 10, the volatility, i.e., the width of the range, of 
1-year price changes of the EM IG bond portfolio hedged by short positions in the US 
Treasuries is superior to the volatility of price changes for the non-hedged portfolio. 
 
Figure 11 represents the time behavior of the 2-year changes in value of the model EM IG 
corporate bond portfolio and in the risk-free UST bond portfolio, with the rebalancing rate 
of the portfolios equal to 2 years.  
 
 
 
Figure 11. 2-year price changes for the EM IG and UST portfolios with 2 year bond 
holding period.  
 
The chart above starts with the points plotted for December 31, 2005, which represent 
changes in the values of the portfolios occurred over the 2 years started December 31, 2003. 
One clearly observes that during the period prior and after the apogee of the global financial 
crises, in this case along 2006 – 2012, the changes in the portfolio values are in an opposite 
mode. 
 
Hence, under the above mentioned assumptions regarding the portfolio strategy, i.e., 2-year 
long horizon to measure portfolio results and 2-year stay of the bonds in the portfolio, – the 
hedging of the EM IG portfolio with the short UST positions do not compensate the negative 
impacts, during the periods when such setoff is the most needed. Fig 12 shows the time 
behavior of the 2-year changes in value of the model EM IG corporate bond portfolio hedged 
by the short positions in UST bonds under the assumption of the complete portfolio 
rebalancing over 2-year time interval. 
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Figure 12. 2-year price changes for the EM IG long + UST short portfolio rebalancing over 
2 years  
 
As we could see by comparing Figures 11 and 12, the volatility, i.e., the width of the range, 
of 2-year price changes of the EM IG bond portfolio hedged by short positions in the US 
Treasuries is superior to the volatility of price changes for the non-hedged portfolio.  
 
Figure 13 represents the time behavior of the 3-year changes in value of the model EM IG 
corporate bond portfolio and in the risk-free UST bond portfolio, with the rebalancing rate 
of the portfolios equal to 3 years.  
 
 
 
Figure 13. 3-year price changes for the EM IG and UST portfolios with 3 year bond 
holding period.  
 
The chart above starts with the points plotted for December 31, 2007, which represent 
changes in the values of the portfolios occurred over the 3 years started December 31, 2004. 
One clearly observes that during the period prior and after the apogee of the global financial 
crises, in this case along 2007 – 2012, the changes in the portfolio values are in an opposite 
mode.  
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Hence, under the above mentioned assumptions regarding the portfolio strategy, i.e., 3-year 
long horizon to measure portfolio results and 3-year stay of the bonds in the portfolio, – the 
hedging of the EM IG portfolio with the short UST positions do not compensate the negative 
impacts, during the periods when such setoff is the most needed. Fig 14 shows the time 
behavior of the 3-year changes in value of the model EM IG corporate bond portfolio hedged 
by the short positions in UST bonds under the assumption of the complete portfolio 
rebalancing over 3-year time interval. 
 
 
 
Figure 14. 3-year price changes for the EM IG long + UST short portfolio rebalancing over 
3 years  
 
As we could see by comparing Figures 13 and 14, the volatility, i.e., the width of the range, 
of 3-year price changes of the EM IG bond portfolio hedged by short positions in the US 
Treasuries is superior to the volatility of price changes for the non-hedged portfolio.  
 
Table 2 provides the comparative analysis of upside and downside risk in the modeled EM 
IG portfolios of 1000 million USD, observed over the available present value gauging 
window as a function of the complete portfolio rebalancing period, i.e. the time each bond 
spends in the portfolio or the bond holding period, and of the time horizon used to calculate 
impacts in present values of the respective portfolios.  
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Table 2. EM IG portfolios upsides and downsides for diverse bond holding periods and 
portfolio impact horizons 
 
As could be seen from Table 2 the difference between the lowest losses and the highest gains 
in value of the portfolios hedged with short UST positions is always superior to that 
difference calculated for the unhedged portfolios. It means that, over the considered time 
windows, such hedge in fact does not hedge against the most extreme changes in IRR of the 
EM IG portfolios but rather leverage their IRR exposure. In more details the implications of 
these results will be addressed in the section dedicated to Discussions and Implications.  
 
Table 3 provides the comparative analysis of the average returns originated from asset value 
changes. These returns were averaged over the respective available windows of price 
changes. We present our results for the long EM IG portfolio, long UST portfolio, and the 
long EM IG portfolio hedged with the portfolio of short positions in the UST. The comparison 
is made for several combinations of portfolio rebalancing rates and portfolio impact horizon 
intervals. 
 
 
 
Table 3. Average asset value driven returns for the long EM IG, long UST, and hedged 
long EM IG short UST portfolios for diverse bond holding periods and impact horizons. 
 
 
Bond 
Holding 
Period
Portfolio 
Impact 
Horizon
Available 
price history 
window
Available 
window of 
price changes 
EM IG 
max 
downside
UST short + 
EM IG max 
downside
EM IG 
max 
upside
UST short + 
EM IG max 
upside
1Y 1Y 2003-2015 2004-2015 -167.85 -160.46 256.24 287.26
2Y 1Y 2004-2015 2005-2015 -184.47 -209.07 245.20 283.22
2Y 2Y 2004-2015 2006-2015 -182.52 -248.31 264.64 272.48
3Y 1Y 2005-2015 2006-2015 -180.79 -230.29 228.31 254.94
3Y 2Y 2005-2015 2007-2015 -188.31 -278.39 267.66 288.34
3Y 3Y 2005-2015 2008-2015 -185.93 -297.64 239.38 266.04
Bond 
Holding 
Period
Portfolio 
Impact 
Horizon
Available 
price history 
window
Available 
window of 
price changes 
Average 
EM IG 
return, (%)
Average 
UST 
return, (%)
Average EM 
IG + short UST 
return, (%)
1Y 1Y 2003-2015 2004-2015 -0.21% -0.06% -0.15%
2Y 1Y 2004-2015 2005-2015 -0.13% 0.10% -0.23%
2Y 2Y 2004-2015 2006-2015 -0.26% 0.15% -0.41%
3Y 1Y 2005-2015 2006-2015 -0.23% 0.20% -0.43%
3Y 2Y 2005-2015 2007-2015 -0.14% 0.42% -0.55%
3Y 3Y 2005-2015 2008-2015 0.03% 0.57% -0.54%
 20
As could be seen from Table 3 for the average asset value driven returns of EM IG portfolios, 
they are slightly negative for the return gauging windows starting in the pre-crisis years. For 
the last window 2008-2015 the average return becomes slightly positive as this window 
predominantly covers the post-crisis recovery.  The average returns of the UST portfolios are 
predominantly positive, reflecting the fact that the variations in interest rates are largely 
downward since 2005 as could be seen in Figures 1 and 2. In its turn this also explains an 
inefficiency of IRR hedging by short positions in US Treasuries from the point the point of 
view of improving IG EM corporate portfolio performance and/or mitigating downside risks.  
 
 
4.3.2. EM HY corporate bond portfolios  
 
Figure 15 represents the time behavior of the 1-year changes in value of the model EM HY 
corporate bond portfolio and in the risk-free UST bond portfolio, with the rebalancing rate 
of the portfolios equal to 1 year.  
 
 
 
Figure 15. 1-year price changes for the EM HY and UST portfolios with 1 year bond 
holding period.  
 
How to read this chart? The points plotted for December 31, 2003, represent changes in the 
values of the portfolios occurred over the 1 year started December 31, 2002. One clearly 
observes that during the period prior and after the apogee of the global financial crises, in 
this case along 2007 – 2012, the changes in the portfolio values are in an opposite mode. 
Note that the range of changes in EM HY portfolio price is several times wider than the range 
of changes in the value of risk-free UST portfolio.  
 
Hence, under the above mentioned assumptions regarding the portfolio strategy, i.e., 1-year 
long horizon to measure portfolio results and 1-year stay of the bonds in the portfolio, – the 
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hedging of the EM HY portfolio with the short UST positions do not compensate the negative 
impacts, during the periods when such setoff is the most needed. Fig 16 shows the time 
behavior of the 1-year changes in value of the model EM HY corporate bond portfolio hedged 
by the short positions in UST bonds, under the assumption of the complete portfolio 
rebalancing over 1-year time interval.  
 
 
Figure 16. 1-year price changes for the EM HY long + UST short portfolio rebalancing 
over 1 year  
 
As we could see by comparing Figures 15 and 16, the volatility, i.e., the width of the range, 
of 1-year price changes of the EM HY bond portfolio hedged by short positions in the US 
Treasuries is superior to the volatility of price changes for the non-hedged portfolio.  
 
Figure 17 represents the time behavior of the 2-year changes in value of the model EM HY 
corporate bond portfolio and in the risk-free UST bond portfolio, with the rebalancing rate 
of the portfolios equal to 2 years.  
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Figure 17. 2-year price changes for the EM HY and UST portfolios with 2 year bond 
holding period.  
 
The chart above starts with the points plotted for December 31, 2005, which represent 
changes in the values of the portfolios occurred over the 2 years started December 31, 2003. 
One clearly observes that during the period prior and after the apogee of the global financial 
crises, in this case along 2006 – 2013, the changes in the portfolio values are in an opposite 
mode. 
 
Hence, under the above mentioned assumptions regarding the portfolio strategy, i.e., 2-year 
long horizon to measure portfolio results and 2-year stay of the bonds in the portfolio, – the 
hedging of the EM HY portfolio with the short UST positions do not compensate the negative 
impacts, during the periods when such setoff is the most needed. Fig 18 shows the time 
behavior of the 2-year changes in value of the model EM HY corporate bond portfolio hedged 
by the short positions in UST bonds under the assumption of the complete portfolio 
rebalancing over 2-year time interval. 
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Figure 18. 2-year price changes for the EM HY long + UST short portfolio rebalancing 
over 2 years  
 
As we could see by comparing Figures 17 and 18, the volatility, i.e., the width of the range, 
of 2-year price changes of the EM HY bond portfolio hedged by short positions in the US 
Treasuries is superior to the volatility of price changes for the non-hedged portfolio.  
 
Figure 19 represents the time behavior of the 3-year changes in value of the model EM HY 
corporate bond portfolio and in the risk-free UST bond portfolio, with the rebalancing rate 
of the portfolios equal to 3 years.  
 
 
 
Figure 19. 3-year price changes for the EM HY and UST portfolios with 3 year bond 
holding period.  
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The chart above starts with the points plotted for December 31, 2007, which represent 
changes in the values of the portfolios occurred over the 3 years started December 31, 2004. 
One clearly observes that during the period prior and after the apogee of the global financial 
crises, in this case along 2007 – 2013, the changes in the portfolio values are in an opposite 
mode. 
 
Hence, under the above mentioned assumptions regarding the portfolio strategy, i.e., 3-year 
long horizon to measure portfolio results and 3-year stay of the bonds in the portfolio, – the 
hedging of the EM HY portfolio with the short UST positions do not compensate the negative 
impacts, during the periods when such setoff is the most needed. Fig 20 shows the time 
behavior of the 3-year changes in value of the model EM HY corporate bond portfolio hedged 
by the short positions in UST bonds under the assumption of the complete portfolio 
rebalancing over 3-year time interval. 
 
 
Figure 20. 3-year price changes for the EM HY long + UST short portfolio rebalancing 
over 3 years  
 
As we could see by comparing Figures 19 and 20, the volatility, i.e., the width of the range, 
of 3-year price changes of the EM HY bond portfolio hedged by short positions in the US 
Treasuries is superior to the volatility of price changes for the non-hedged portfolio.  
 
Table 4 provides the comparative analysis of upside and downside risk in the modeled EM 
HY portfolios of 1000 million USD, observed over the available present value gauging 
window as a function of the complete portfolio rebalancing period, i.e. the time each bond 
spends in the portfolio or the bond holding period, and of the time horizon used to calculate 
impacts in present values of the respective portfolios.  
 
‐700‐600
‐500‐400
‐300‐200
‐1000
100
200
300
400
500
600
 25
 
 
Table 4. EM HY portfolios upsides and downsides for diverse bond holding periods and 
portfolio impact horizons 
 
 
As could be seen from Table 4 the difference between the lowest losses and the highest gains 
in value of the portfolios hedged with short UST positions is always superior to that 
difference calculated for the unhedged portfolios. It means that, over the considered time 
windows, such hedge in fact does not hedge against the most extreme changes in IRR of the 
EM HY portfolios but rather leverage their IRR exposure. In more details the implications of 
these results will be addressed in the section dedicated to Discussions and Implications.  
 
Table 5 provides the comparative analysis of the average returns originated from asset value 
changes. These returns were averaged over the respective available windows of price 
changes. We present our results for the long EM HY portfolio, long UST portfolio, and the 
long EM HY portfolio hedged with the portfolio of short positions in the UST. The 
comparison is made for several combinations of portfolio rebalancing rates and portfolio 
impact horizon intervals. 
 
 
 
Table 5. Average asset value driven returns for the long EM HY, long UST, and hedged 
long EM HY short UST portfolios for diverse bond holding periods and impact horizons. 
 
 
Bond 
Holding 
Period
Portfolio 
Impact 
Horizon
Available 
price history 
window
Available 
window of 
price changes 
EM HY 
max 
downside
UST short + 
EM HY max 
downside
EM HY 
max 
upside
UST short + 
EM HY max 
upside
1Y 1Y 2003-2015 2004-2015 -385.27 -377.88 637.58 677.71
2Y 1Y 2004-2015 2005-2015 -421.11 -445.59 529.87 602.50
2Y 2Y 2004-2015 2006-2015 -472.27 -538.06 683.39 695.76
3Y 1Y 2005-2015 2006-2015 -441.70 -491.20 485.97 559.59
3Y 2Y 2005-2015 2007-2015 -520.06 -610.99 648.14 664.14
3Y 3Y 2005-2015 2008-2015 -576.26 -691.85 546.30 572.96
Bond 
Holding 
Period
Portfolio 
Impact 
Horizon
Available 
price history 
window
Available 
window of 
price changes 
Average 
EM HY 
return, (%)
Average 
UST 
return, (%)
Average EM 
HY + short 
UST return, (%)
1Y 1Y 2003-2015 2004-2015 -1.18% -0.06% -1.12%
2Y 1Y 2004-2015 2005-2015 -1.49% 0.10% -1.59%
2Y 2Y 2004-2015 2006-2015 -2.53% 0.15% -2.69%
3Y 1Y 2005-2015 2006-2015 -1.99% 0.20% -2.19%
3Y 2Y 2005-2015 2007-2015 -2.95% 0.42% -3.37%
3Y 3Y 2005-2015 2008-2015 -3.19% 0.57% -3.76%
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As could be seen from Table 5 for the average asset value driven returns of EM HY portfolios, 
they are considerably negative for all the presented here results gauging windows, reflecting 
the fact that EM HY corporates bonds were affected more strongly by the global financial 
crisis than the EM IG corporates securities. As it was mentioned while analyzing Table 3, the 
average returns of the UST portfolios are predominantly positive, reflecting the fact that the 
variations in interest rates are largely downward after since 2005, see Figures 1 and 2.  In its 
turn this also explains an inefficiency of IRR hedging by short positions in US Treasuries 
from the point the point of view of improving HY EM corporate portfolio performance and/or 
mitigating downside risks.   
 
 
4.3.3. Comparing performance of EM IG and HY corporate bond portfolios 
 
It is worth performing comparative analysis of the EM IG and EM HY portfolios. Table 6 
presents ranges of asset price volatility, calculated as the highest upside minus the lowest 
downside in the present value of the portfolio observed along the available window of price 
changes, for both, hedged by UST and unhedged EM IG and HY portfolios. 
 
 
 
Table 6. Price volatility ranges for EM IG and EM HY portfolios for diverse bond holding 
periods and portfolio impact horizons. 
 
We clearly observe that the ranges of price changes for EM IG portfolios are more than two 
times narrower than those for EM HY portfolios. Thus, for the case of EM, our results 
explicitly attest that the present values of HY portfolios are much more volatile than the 
present values of IG portfolios.  
 
Table 7 below summarizes statistics for the average returns of the unhedged EM IG, EM HY, 
and UST portfolios for diverse bond holding periods and portfolio impact horizons. The last 
two columns on the right hand side of the table present the average returns of EM IG and EM 
HY portfolios, respectively, being both hedged by short positions in US treasuries.  
 
Bond 
Holding 
Period
Portfolio 
Impact 
Horizon
Available 
price history 
window
Available 
window of 
price changes 
Unhedged 
EM IG P&L 
volatility range
Hedged 
EM IG P&L 
volatility range
Unhedged 
EM HY P&L 
volatility range
Hedged 
EM HY P&L 
volatility range
1Y 1Y 2003-2015 2004-2015 424.09 447.72 1022.85 1055.59
2Y 1Y 2004-2015 2005-2015 429.67 492.29 950.99 1048.09
2Y 2Y 2004-2015 2006-2015 447.16 520.78 1155.66 1233.81
3Y 1Y 2005-2015 2006-2015 409.10 485.23 927.67 1050.79
3Y 2Y 2005-2015 2007-2015 455.97 566.73 1168.19 1275.14
3Y 3Y 2005-2015 2008-2015 425.31 563.68 1122.55 1264.80
 27
 
 
Table 7. Average asset value driven returns of EM IG, EM HY, and UST portfolios for 
diverse bond holding periods and portfolio impact horizons. 
 
For the EM HY portfolios the average returns for the observed windows of price changes are 
considerably lower than the average returns for EM IG portfolios. It is somewhat expected 
result as the EM HY corporate bonds were supposed to be much more affected by the global 
financial crisis than the IM IG corporates. Still it is important to note, that the presented in 
Table 7 returns do not incorporate a part of net interest income (NII) pocketed along the 
available windows of price changes. As could be seen from Figures 2 and 3 the yields of EM 
IG and EM HY portfolios are always above 4% and 7%, respectively. Hence, the overall 
average results of holding EM portfolios during the analyzed periods are positive. This is 
consistent with conclusions from the trends of diverse total return indexes through the time 
intervals under considerations; see for example J.P. Morgan EMBI Global Composite 
(Bloomberg ticker JPEGCOMP). Nevertheless, as we are focused at interest rate sensitivity 
of assets in a sense of interest rate induced impacts in the present value of assets, we opt to 
leave NII considerations and total return considerations out of the scope of our analysis.  
 
 
4.4. Assessing price-wise interest rate sensitivity of EM bond portfolios 
 
In this section we perform a quantitative assessment of the price sensitivity of a chosen EM 
portfolio to changes in prices of the corresponding portfolio of US Treasuries. Instead of 
trying to come up with average sensitivity figures for all the available data history, we apply 
the methodology developed in Gubareva M. & Borges M. (2016). So, we identify the local 
extrema of the presented in the previous section 4.3 modeled historical series of annual 
changes in present values of the UST and EM bonds portfolios. In this way, we have 
identified 61 big moves, i.e. ups and downs, which we distributed among 3 period: 20 price 
moves in the “old normal” pre-crisis period (01.01.2004 – 13.07.2007), 31 moves during the 
ignition of and healing from the crisis (13.07.2007 – 04.04.2013), and 20 moves during the 
“new normal” post-crisis period (03.04.2013 – 30.06.2016). The sensitivity figures are 
calculated separately for each gains/losses move for both, IG and HY EM bond portfolios.  
 
Bond 
Holding 
Period
Portfolio 
Impact 
Horizon
Available 
price history 
window
Available 
window of 
price changes 
Average 
EM IG 
return, (%)
Average 
EM HY 
return, (%)
Average 
UST 
return, (%)
Average 
EM IG + 
short UST 
return, (%)
Average 
EM HY + 
short UST 
return, (%)
1Y 1Y 2003-2015 2004-2015 -0.21% -1.18% -0.06% -0.15% -1.12%
2Y 1Y 2004-2015 2005-2015 -0.13% -1.49% 0.10% -0.23% -1.59%
2Y 2Y 2004-2015 2006-2015 -0.26% -2.53% 0.15% -0.41% -2.69%
3Y 1Y 2005-2015 2006-2015 -0.23% -1.99% 0.20% -0.43% -2.19%
3Y 2Y 2005-2015 2007-2015 -0.14% -2.95% 0.42% -0.55% -3.37%
3Y 3Y 2005-2015 2008-2015 0.03% -3.19% 0.57% -0.54% -3.76%
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It is worth noting that being focused at price changes over rather long periods of one, two, 
and three years, we are not so much interested in daily responses of EM portfolios to daily 
moves in the yield of US government securities, even though all the historical series of price 
changes are calculated on a daily basis. We approach the problem of interest rate sensitivity 
from the portfolio management and risk management perspective, and hence we try to 
understand how EM portfolio prices respond to the inducing moves of UST prices. At this 
stage we also restrict the scope of our sensitivity studies to portfolios which are completely 
rebalanced during 1 year and analyze the impacts in asset prices over the 1 year horizon, see 
Figure 9 for the case of EM IG portfolio and Figure 15 for the case of EM HY portfolio. 
Comparative analyses of HY versus IG debt sensitivities are also provided. 
 
 
4.4.1. Price-wise interest rate sensitivity during the pre-crisis period 
 
4.4.1.1. Pre-crisis price-wise interest rate sensitivity of EM IG portfolio 
 
Table 8 represents 20 major moves in the over-1-year price changes during the “old normal” 
pre-crisis period (01.01.2004 – 13.07.2007). For each of these 20 time windows we calculate 
the corresponding 1-year price change deltas for both, the UST and EM IG modeled 
portfolios. We also present the respective sensitivity coefficient calculated as the ratio of the 
value change delta observed in the EM IG portfolio to the “inducing” value change delta 
observed in the UST portfolio. For informative purposes we present our calculations of 
arithmetic average, endurance window weighted average, amplitude weighted average and 
endurance-times-amplitude weighted average of sensitivity coefficients. These values are 
averaged over three different aggregated arrays of the windows; the aggregate array of the 
UST positive deltas, the aggregate array of the UST negative deltas, and for the entire span 
of the “old normal” pre-crisis interval.  
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Table 8. Price-wise IR sensitivity of EM IG bonds along the pre-crisis period.  
 
 
Although the four sensitivity column of Table 8 present the four different kinds of sensitivity 
mentioned above, we argue that from the portfolio management and/or risk management 
perspective the most comprehensive figures are the three sensitivity coefficients at the bottom 
of the right-most column, that is, endurance-times-amplitude weighted average of sensitivity 
coefficients. In this way, while calculating the averaged figures we ascribe bigger weights to 
stronger and more lasting moves of the risk-free interest rates, as exactly these types of moves 
are expected to and in fact provide the most important impacts on EM IG portfolios from an 
asset value perspective.  
 
The sensitivity averaged over the entire “old normal” pre-crisis period (01.01.2004 – 
13.07.2007), i.e. 0.96, is very closed to 1, meaning that price changes relative to EM IG 
Date 
Endurance 
window 
(days) 
(A)
∆ in UST
 1Y price 
change
(B)
∆ in EM IG 
1Y price 
change
 (C)
Sensitivity 
D = C / B
Endurance 
weighted 
sensitivity 
E = A x D
Amplitude 
weighted 
sensitivity 
F = |B| x D
Endurance and 
Amplitude 
weighted sensitivity 
G = A x |B| x D 
01-01-2004
13-01-2004 13 32,69 21,39 0,65 8,5 21,4 278
03-03-2004 50 -17,31 -17,74 1,03 51,3 17,7 887
22-03-2004 19 43,08 30,05 0,70 13,3 30,0 571
14-06-2004 84 -83,17 -102,16 1,23 103,2 102,2 8582
31-08-2004 78 122,43 107,74 0,88 68,6 107,7 8404
30-09-2004 30 -38,80 -16,28 0,42 12,6 16,3 488
29-10-2004 29 25,07 17,77 0,71 20,5 17,8 515
11-01-2005 74 -33,74 -17,21 0,51 37,7 17,2 1273
08-02-2005 28 11,50 21,18 1,84 51,6 21,2 593
16-03-2005 36 -39,45 -36,30 0,92 33,1 36,3 1307
24-05-2005 69 71,71 58,67 0,82 56,4 58,7 4048
03-11-2005 163 -60,44 -71,07 1,18 191,7 71,1 11584
24-03-2006 141 39,13 27,10 0,69 97,6 27,1 3821
26-06-2006 94 -42,31 -41,96 0,99 93,2 42,0 3945
04-12-2006 161 70,08 79,27 1,13 182,1 79,3 12762
10-01-2007 37 -20,35 -15,01 0,74 27,3 15,0 555
25-04-2007 105 23,27 20,91 0,90 94,3 20,9 2195
04-06-2007 40 -25,41 -13,53 0,53 21,3 13,5 541
27-06-2007 23 5,70 2,31 0,41 9,3 2,3 53
13-07-2007 16 -12,89 -14,13 1,10 17,5 14,1 226
Total (Average): 
UST gain windows 666 444,66 386,37 0,87 0,90 0,87 0,92
Total (Average): 
UST loss windows
624 -373,86 -345,40 0,86 0,94 0,92 1,02
0,87 0,92 0,89 0,96Sensitivity Averaged over the whole period
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portfolio closely mirror price changes of UST portfolio. In other words, a move in the risk-
free interest rate is almost entirely passed through to the yield of EM IG bonds.  
 
While comparing EM IG sensitivity averaged over the windows of the positive UST price 
deltas (risk free-rates downtrend intervals), i.e. 0.92, with EM IG sensitivity averaged over 
the windows of the negative UST price deltas (risk free-rates uptrend intervals), i.e. 1.02 we 
could infer that decreases of risk-free interest rates affect EM IG bonds in a weaker manner 
than the increases of risk-free interest rates. In other words, the EM IG portfolio suffers from 
risk-free rate increases more than benefits from risk-free rate decreases. 
 
Figure 21 below represents historic behavior of endurance-times-amplitude weighted 
sensitivity; see the right most column of Table 8. The value of the sensitivity is depicted 
constant for the entire interval along which it was calculated. 
 
 
 
Figure 21. Price-wise endurance-times-amplitude weighted sensitivity of EM IG portfolio 
along the pre-crisis period (01.01.2004 – 13.07.2007). 
 
Although the dynamics of sensitivity exhibits certain volatility, the value of sensitivity 
coefficient always remains positive. For the major part of time, it is situated within 0.7 - 1.2 
range, centered at its average value of 0.96. When the value of sensitivity coefficient is below 
1, the impact of risk-free interest rate changes is damped. On the contrary, when the value of 
sensitivity coefficient is above 1 the impact of risk-free interest rate changes on EM IG 
portfolio prices is amplified.  
 
0
0,2
0,4
0,6
0,8
1
1,2
1,4
1,6
1,8
2
01‐01‐2004 01‐01‐2005 01‐01‐2006 01‐01‐2007
Sensitivity
Avg. Sensitivity
 31
 
4.4.1.2. Pre-crisis price-wise interest rate sensitivity of EM HY portfolio 
 
Similarly to the case of IG, Table 9 represents 20 major moves in the over-1-year price 
changes of EM HY portfolio during the “old normal” pre-crisis period (01.01.2004 – 
13.07.2007). For each of these 20 time windows we calculate the corresponding 1-year price 
change deltas for both, the UST and EM HY modeled portfolios. We also present the 
respective sensitivity coefficient calculated as the ratio of the value change delta observed in 
the EM HY portfolio to the “inducing” value change delta observed in the UST portfolio. For 
informative purposes we present our calculations of arithmetic average, endurance window 
weighted average, amplitude weighted average and endurance-times-amplitude weighted 
average of sensitivity coefficients. These values are averaged over three different aggregated 
arrays of the windows; the aggregate array of the UST positive deltas, the aggregate array of 
the UST negative deltas, and for the entire span of the “old normal” pre-crisis interval.   
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Table 9. Price-wise IR sensitivity of EM HY bonds along the pre-crisis period.  
 
 
As could be seen in the right-most column of Table 9, the endurance-times-amplitudes 
weighted sensitivity of EM HY portfolio averaged over the whole “old normal” pre-crisis 
period (01.01.2004 – 13.07.2007), i.e. 0.96, is very closed to 1 as well as in the case of the 
EM IG portfolio. It means that price changes relative to EM HY portfolio on average closely 
mirror price changes of UST portfolio. In other words, a move in the risk-free interest rate is 
almost entirely passed through to the yield of EM HY bonds.  
 
While comparing EM HY sensitivity averaged over the windows of the positive UST price 
deltas (risk free-rates downtrend intervals), i.e. 0.77, with EM HY sensitivity averaged over 
the windows of the negative UST price deltas (risk free-rates uptrend intervals), i.e. 1.19 we 
could infer that decreases of risk-free interest rates affect EM HY bonds in a weaker manner 
Date 
Endurance 
window 
(days) 
(A)
∆ in UST
 1Y price 
change
(B)
∆ in EM IG 
1Y price 
change
 (C)
Sensitivity 
D = C / B
Endurance 
weighted 
sensitivity 
E = A x D
Amplitude 
weighted 
sensitivity 
F = |B| x D
Endurance and 
Amplitude 
weighted sensitivity 
G = A x |B| x D 
01-01-2004
13-01-2004 13 32,69 -6,45 -0,20 -2,6 -6,5 -84
03-03-2004 50 -17,31 -99,99 5,78 288,9 100,0 5000
22-03-2004 19 43,08 4,74 0,11 2,1 4,7 90
14-06-2004 84 -83,17 -159,91 1,92 161,5 159,9 13432
31-08-2004 78 122,43 124,53 1,02 79,3 124,5 9713
30-09-2004 30 -38,80 31,42 -0,81 -24,3 -31,4 -943
29-10-2004 29 25,07 7,77 0,31 9,0 7,8 225
11-01-2005 74 -33,74 40,98 -1,21 -89,9 -41,0 -3032
08-02-2005 28 11,50 32,09 2,79 78,1 32,1 898
16-03-2005 36 -39,45 -5,54 0,14 5,1 5,5 199
24-05-2005 69 71,71 28,26 0,39 27,2 28,3 1950
03-11-2005 163 -60,44 -98,82 1,64 266,5 98,8 16108
24-03-2006 141 39,13 36,83 0,94 132,7 36,8 5193
26-06-2006 94 -42,31 -30,74 0,73 68,3 30,7 2890
04-12-2006 161 70,08 40,87 0,58 93,9 40,9 6580
10-01-2007 37 -20,35 -2,99 0,15 5,4 3,0 111
25-04-2007 105 23,27 29,22 1,26 131,8 29,2 3068
04-06-2007 40 -25,41 -9,60 0,38 15,1 9,6 384
27-06-2007 23 5,70 4,01 0,70 16,2 4,0 92
13-07-2007 16 -12,89 -9,35 0,73 11,6 9,3 150
Total (Average): 
UST gain windows
666 444,66 301,85 0,79 0,85 0,68 0,77
Total (Average): 
UST loss windows
624 -373,86 -344,54 0,94 1,13 0,92 1,19
0,87 0,99 0,79 0,96Sensitivity Averaged over the whole period
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than the increases of risk-free interest rates. In other words, the EM HY portfolio suffers from 
risk-free rate increases more than benefits from risk-free rate decreases. Although as stated 
above for the entire span of the pre-crisis period, a move in the risk-free interest rate is almost 
entirely passed through to the yield of EM HY bonds, for the risk free-rates downtrend 
intervals roughly only 77% of a move in the risk-free interest rate is passed through while for 
risk free-rates uptrend intervals roughly 119% is passed through to the yield of EM HY 
bonds. 
 
Figure 22 below represents historic behavior of endurance-times-amplitude weighted 
sensitivity; see the right most column of Table 9. The value of the sensitivity is depicted 
constant for the entire interval along which it was calculated. 
 
 
Figure 22. Price-wise endurance-times-amplitude weighted sensitivity of EM HY portfolio 
along the pre-crisis period (01.01.2004 – 13.07.2007). 
 
In this case of the EM HY portfolio the dynamics of sensitivity exhibits considerable 
volatility in such a way that the value of sensitivity coefficient for a few intervals becomes 
negative. The range of volatility -1.2 – 5.8  is roughly four times larger than the range 
observed in the case of the EM IG portfolio: 0.4 – 1.8, see Figure 21.  It may also mean that 
certain factors common for EM HY debt, but different from risk-free interest rate 
consideration, could impact prices of EM HY bond portfolio in a much more severe manner 
than prices of EM IG bond portfolios, either amplifying (sensitivity above 1), or reducing 
(sensitivity between 0 and 1), and even inverting (sensitivity below 0) impacts of the 
respective UST portfolio dynamics.  These common EM HY debt factors could be 
represented, for instance, by sudden changes in HY risk perception, risk-on/risk-off market 
‐2
‐1
0
1
2
3
4
5
6
01‐01‐2004 01‐01‐2005 01‐01‐2006 01‐01‐2007
Sensitivity
Avg. Sensitivity
 34
attitude switches, and EM specific flights-to-quality. Nevertheless, the average sensitivity 
over the entire pre-crisis period is equal to 0.96, i.e. closed to 1 meaning that on average all 
these impacts of leads and lags-like imperfections are cancelled out.  
 
 
4.4.2. Price-wise interest rate sensitivity during the crisis period  
 
4.4.2.1. Through-the-crisis price-wise interest rate sensitivity of EM IG portfolio 
 
Similarly to the results presented in the Section 4.4.1 for the pre-crisis period, Table 10 
represents 31 major moves in the over-1-year price changes during the “distressed” through-
the-crisis period (13.07.2007 – 03.04.2013). For each of these 31 time windows we calculate 
the corresponding 1-year price change deltas for both, the UST and EM IG modeled 
portfolios. We also present the respective sensitivity coefficient calculated as the ratio of the 
value change delta observed in the EM IG portfolio to the “inducing” value change delta 
observed in the UST portfolio. For informative purposes we present our calculations of 
arithmetic average, endurance window weighted average, amplitude weighted average and 
endurance-times-amplitude weighted average of sensitivity coefficients. These values are 
averaged over three different aggregated arrays of the windows; the aggregate array of the 
UST positive deltas, the aggregate array of the UST negative deltas, and for the entire span 
of the “distressed” through-the-crisis interval.  
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Table 10. Price-wise IR sensitivity of EM IG bonds along the through-the-crisis period.  
 
As could be seen in the right-most column of Table 10, the endurance-times-amplitudes 
weighted sensitivity of EM IG portfolio averaged over the whole “distressed” through-the-
crisis period (13.07.2007 – 03.04.2013) is negative and equal to -0.53. It means that on 
Date 
Endurance 
window 
(days) 
(A)
∆ in UST
 1Y price 
change
(B)
∆ in EM IG 
1Y price 
change
 (C)
Sensitivity 
D = C / B
Endurance 
weighted 
sensitivity 
E = A x D
Amplitude 
weighted 
sensitivity 
F = |B| x D
Endurance and 
Amplitude 
weighted sensitivity 
G = A x |B| x D 
13-07-2007
26-11-2007 136 43,60 -35,00 -0,80 -109,2 -35,0 -4760
26-12-2007 30 -26,26 -2,19 0,08 2,5 2,2 66
22-01-2008 27 56,38 14,17 0,25 6,8 14,2 383
27-02-2008 36 -39,44 -20,30 0,51 18,5 20,3 731
06-06-2008 100 -5,67 29,48 -5,19 -519,5 -29,5 -2948
01-07-2008 25 -20,75 -11,26 0,54 13,6 11,3 282
08-09-2008 69 -29,85 2,14 -0,07 -5,0 -2,1 -148
07-10-2008 29 35,21 -42,91 -1,22 -35,3 -42,9 -1244
29-10-2008 22 -29,36 -113,74 3,87 85,2 113,7 2502
24-11-2008 26 -16,25 57,61 -3,54 -92,2 -57,6 -1498
16-12-2008 22 57,41 36,56 0,64 14,0 36,6 804
17-03-2009 91 -91,12 33,09 -0,36 -33,0 -33,1 -3011
27-04-2009 41 57,98 49,81 0,86 35,2 49,8 2042
08-06-2009 42 -47,43 37,37 -0,79 -33,1 -37,4 -1569
22-07-2009 44 41,75 35,13 0,84 37,0 35,1 1546
29-10-2009 99 -25,97 174,54 -6,72 -665,4 -174,5 -17279
30-12-2009 62 -54,23 -126,40 2,33 144,5 126,4 7837
10-08-2010 223 147,54 -173,05 -1,17 -261,5 -173,0 -38590
10-09-2010 31 -29,52 -23,33 0,79 24,5 23,3 723
04-11-2010 55 26,23 15,70 0,60 32,9 15,7 863
17-11-2010 13 -32,48 -20,40 0,63 8,2 20,4 265
01-07-2011 226 -53,29 53,55 -1,00 -227,1 -53,5 -12102
09-09-2011 70 40,89 3,34 0,08 5,7 3,3 234
12-10-2011 33 -37,06 -28,81 0,78 25,7 28,8 951
14-02-2012 125 71,96 58,55 0,81 101,7 58,6 7319
19-03-2012 34 -42,67 -4,59 0,11 3,7 4,6 156
10-04-2012 22 31,96 3,41 0,11 2,4 3,4 75
31-05-2012 51 -29,62 -14,42 0,49 24,8 14,4 736
03-10-2012 125 -33,81 51,86 -1,53 -191,7 -51,9 -6482
29-01-2013 118 -15,88 -44,72 2,82 332,4 44,7 5277
03-04-2013 64 37,32 -12,37 -0,33 -21,2 -12,4 -792
Total (Average): 
UST gain windows 858 648,23 -46,66 0,06 -0,22 -0,07 -0,51
Total (Average): 
UST loss windows
1233 -660,65 29,46 -0,33 -0,88 -0,04 -0,55
-0,14 -0,61 -0,06 -0,53Sensitivity Averaged over the whole period
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average price changes of the EM IG portfolio exhibit inverted behavior while compared to 
price changes of the UST portfolio.  
 
The sign of a price change delta relative to the EM IG portfolio is opposite to the price change 
delta observed in the portfolio of US government bonds, while amplitude of a price response 
observed in the EM IG portfolio is equal to 53% of the price change relative to UST 
securities. In other words, during “distressed” through-the-crisis period while the yield on a 
US government debt is rising, the spread of EM IG debt over the UST yield is narrowing in 
such a way that it is absorbing all the increase in risk-free rates and even causes a decrease 
in the EM IG yield. On the contrary, while the yield on a US government debt is decreasing, 
the yield on EM IG bonds is increasing. This behavior corresponds to the outcomes of 
structural Merton´s (1974) model, positing the influence of interest rate changes upon 
creditworthiness of corporate obligors.  
 
It is also worth noting that the endurance-times-amplitude average sensitivity varies 
drastically, if averaging is performed over three different types of the time windows, namely 
gain-gain intervals (blue shadow), loss-loss intervals (beige shadow), and opposite moves 
intervals (violet shadow). The sensitivity coefficient (not presented in Table 10) equals 0.62, 
1.38, and -1.22, respectively. If one applies the endurance-times-amplitude averaging to these 
three figures, result will be the overall negative sensitivity equal to -0.53, as stated in the 
previous paragraph.  
 
Figure 23 below represents historic behavior of endurance-times-amplitude weighted 
sensitivity; see the right most column of Table 10. The value of the sensitivity is depicted 
constant for the entire interval along which it was calculated. 
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Figure 23. Price-wise endurance-times-amplitude weighted sensitivity of EM IG portfolio 
along the through-the-crisis period (13.07.2007 – 03.04.2013). 
 
In this case of the “distressed” through-the-crisis period the dynamics of the EM IG portfolio 
sensitivity exhibits volatility considerably superior to the pre-crisis period. The width of the 
-6.7 – 3.9 volatility range equals to 10.6 being many times wider that the pre-crisis width of 
1.4 as per Figure 21. Although the sensitivity coefficients values exhibit several negative and 
also positive spikes, this volatility range is centered at the negative level of -0.53 certifying 
that the overall price-wise sensitivity of EM IG portfolio is negative though attenuated if 
compared to the amplitude of “inducing” price changes of UST portfolio.  
 
 
4.4.2.2. Through-the-crisis price-wise interest rate sensitivity of EM HY portfolio 
 
Similarly to the results presented in the Section 4.4.2.1 for the EM IG portfolio sensitivity, 
Table 11 represents 31 major moves in the over-1-year price changes during the “distressed” 
through-the-crisis period (13.07.2007 – 03.04.2013). For each of these 31 time windows we 
calculate the corresponding 1-year price change deltas for both, the UST and EM HY 
modeled portfolios. We also present the respective sensitivity coefficient calculated as the 
ratio of the value change delta observed in the EM HY portfolio to the “inducing” value 
change delta observed in the UST portfolio. For informative purposes we present our 
calculations of arithmetic average, endurance window weighted average, amplitude weighted 
average and endurance-times-amplitude weighted average of sensitivity coefficients. These 
values are averaged over three different aggregated arrays of the windows; the aggregate 
‐7,00
‐6,00
‐5,00
‐4,00
‐3,00
‐2,00
‐1,00
0,00
1,00
2,00
3,00
4,00
13‐07‐2007 13‐07‐2008 13‐07‐2009 13‐07‐2010 13‐07‐2011 13‐07‐2012
Sensitivity
Avg. Sensitivity
 38
array of the UST positive deltas, the aggregate array of the UST negative deltas, and for the 
entire span of the “distressed” through-the-crisis interval.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
Date 
Endurance 
window 
(days) 
(A)
∆ in UST
 1Y price 
change
(B)
∆ in EM HY 
1Y price 
change
 (C)
Sensitivity 
D = C / B
Endurance 
weighted 
sensitivity 
E = A x D
Amplitude 
weighted 
sensitivity 
F = |B| x D
Endurance and 
Amplitude 
weighted sensitivity 
G = A x |B| x D 
13-07-2007
26-11-2007 136 43,60 -49,29 -1,13 -153,7 -49,3 -6704
26-12-2007 30 -26,26 0,83 -0,03 -0,9 -0,8 -25
22-01-2008 27 56,38 -5,99 -0,11 -2,9 -6,0 -162
27-02-2008 36 -39,44 9,70 -0,25 -8,9 -9,7 -349
06-06-2008 100 -5,67 33,85 -5,96 -596,5 -33,8 -3385
01-07-2008 25 -20,75 -15,14 0,73 18,2 15,1 379
08-09-2008 69 -29,85 10,73 -0,36 -24,8 -10,7 -741
07-10-2008 29 35,21 -155,80 -4,42 -128,3 -155,8 -4518
29-10-2008 22 -29,36 -211,54 7,21 158,5 211,5 4654
24-11-2008 26 -16,25 83,11 -5,11 -133,0 -83,1 -2161
16-12-2008 22 57,41 60,64 1,06 23,2 60,6 1334
17-03-2009 91 -91,12 45,16 -0,50 -45,1 -45,2 -4109
27-04-2009 41 57,98 133,60 2,30 94,5 133,6 5478
08-06-2009 42 -47,43 147,17 -3,10 -130,3 -147,2 -6181
22-07-2009 44 41,75 77,97 1,87 82,2 78,0 3431
29-10-2009 99 -25,97 473,43 -18,23 -1805,0 -473,4 -46869
30-12-2009 62 -54,23 -169,78 3,13 194,1 169,8 10526
10-08-2010 223 147,54 -559,37 -3,79 -845,4 -559,4 -124740
10-09-2010 31 -29,52 -44,34 1,50 46,6 44,3 1374
04-11-2010 55 26,23 -23,14 -0,88 -48,5 -23,1 -1273
17-11-2010 13 -32,48 -15,88 0,49 6,4 15,9 206
01-07-2011 226 -53,29 96,64 -1,81 -409,9 -96,6 -21840
09-09-2011 70 40,89 -38,69 -0,95 -66,2 -38,7 -2708
12-10-2011 33 -37,06 -48,80 1,32 43,5 48,8 1611
14-02-2012 125 71,96 144,67 2,01 251,3 144,7 18083
19-03-2012 34 -42,67 23,89 -0,56 -19,0 -23,9 -812
10-04-2012 22 31,96 -14,90 -0,47 -10,3 -14,9 -328
31-05-2012 51 -29,62 -0,39 0,01 0,7 0,4 20
03-10-2012 125 -33,81 206,58 -6,11 -763,9 -206,6 -25823
29-01-2013 118 -15,88 -129,50 8,16 962,5 129,5 15281
03-04-2013 64 37,32 -39,89 -1,07 -68,4 -39,9 -2553
Total (Average): 
UST gain windows 858 648,23 -470,19 -0,46 -1,02 -0,73 -1,81
Total (Average): 
UST loss windows
1233 -660,65 495,71 -1,03 -2,03 -0,75 -1,69
-0,75 -1,62 -0,74 -1,76Sensitivity Averaged over the whole period
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Table 11. Price-wise IR sensitivity of EM HY bonds along the through-the-crisis period. 
 
As could be seen in the right-most column of Table 11, the endurance-times-amplitudes 
weighted sensitivity of EM HY portfolio averaged over the whole “distressed” through-the-
crisis period (13.07.2007 – 03.04.2013) is negative and equal to -1.76. It means that on 
average price changes of the EM HY portfolio exhibit inverted behavior while compared to 
price changes of the UST portfolio.  
 
The sign of a price change delta relative to the EM HY portfolio is opposite to the price 
change delta observed in the portfolio of US government bonds, while amplitude of a price 
response observed in the EM IG portfolio is equal to 176% of the price change relative to 
UST securities. In other words, during “distressed” through-the-crisis period while the yield 
on a US government debt is rising, the spread of EM HY debt over the UST yield is narrowing 
in such a way that it is absorbing all the increase in risk-free rates and even causes a decrease 
in the EM HY yield. On the contrary, while the yield on a US government debt is decreasing, 
the yield on EM HY bonds is increasing. As in the EM IG case, this behavior corresponds to 
the outcomes of structural Merton´s (1974) model, but in the EM HY case the amplitude of 
the response is amplified. It certifies that in EM HY case the influence of interest rate changes 
upon creditworthiness of EM HY corporate obligors is stronger than in the case of EM IG 
debt issuers.  
 
It is also worth noting that the endurance-times-amplitude average sensitivity varies 
drastically, if averaging is performed over three different types of the time windows, namely 
gain-gain intervals (blue shadow), loss-loss intervals (beige shadow), and opposite moves 
intervals (violet shadow). The sensitivity coefficient (not presented in Table 11) equals 1.96, 
3.25, and -3.02, respectively. If one applies the endurance-times-amplitude averaging to these 
three figures, result will be the overall negative sensitivity equal to -1.76, as stated in the 
previous paragraph. It is worth noting that during the “distressed” through-the-crisis period 
EM HY portfolios are more than trice sensitive while compared to EM IG portfolios with 
average sensitivity coefficient equal to -0.53. 
 
Figure 24 below represents historic behavior of endurance-times-amplitude weighted 
sensitivity of the EM HY corporate debt; see the right most column of Table 11. The value 
of the sensitivity is depicted constant for the entire interval along which it was calculated. 
 
 
 
 
 40
 
Figure 24. Price-wise endurance-times-amplitude weighted sensitivity of EM HY portfolio 
along the through-the-crisis period (13.07.2007 – 03.04.2013). 
 
In this case of the “distressed” through-the-crisis period the dynamics of the EM HY portfolio 
sensitivity exhibits volatility considerably superior to the pre-crisis period. The width of the 
-18.2 – 8.2 volatility range equals 26.4 being many times wider that the pre-crisis width of 
7.0 as per Figure 22. On the other hand, the range of EM HY volatility -18.2 – 8.2 is roughly 
2.5 times larger than the range observed in the case of the EM IG portfolio: -6.7 – 3.9, see 
Figures 23 and 24.    
 
Although the sensitivity coefficients values exhibit several negative and also positive spikes, 
this volatility range for EM HY corporate debt is centered at the negative level of -1.76 
certifying that the overall price-wise sensitivity of EM HY portfolio is negative and  
amplified if compared to the amplitude of “inducing” price changes of UST portfolio.  
 
 
4.4.3. Price-wise interest rate sensitivity during the post-crisis period  
 
4.4.3.1. Post-crisis price-wise interest rate sensitivity of EM IG portfolio 
 
Table 12 represents 20 major moves in the over-1-year price changes during the “new 
normal” post-crisis period (03.04.2013 – 26.06.2016). For each of these 20 time windows we 
calculate the corresponding 1-year price change deltas for both, the UST and EM IG modeled 
portfolios. We also present the respective sensitivity coefficient calculated as the ratio of the 
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value change delta observed in the EM IG portfolio to the “inducing” value change delta 
observed in the UST portfolio. For informative purposes we present our calculations of 
arithmetic average, endurance window weighted average, amplitude weighted average and 
endurance-times-amplitude weighted average of sensitivity coefficients. These values are 
averaged over three different aggregated arrays of the windows; the aggregate array of the 
UST positive deltas, the aggregate array of the UST negative deltas, and for the entire span 
of the “new normal” post-crisis interval. 
 
 
 
Table 12. Price-wise IR sensitivity of EM IG bonds along the post-crisis period.  
 
As could be seen in the right-most column of Table 12, the endurance-times-amplitudes 
weighted sensitivity of EM IG portfolio averaged over the entire “new normal” post-crisis 
period (03.04.2013 – 26.06.2016), is equal to 0.58. Differently to the “old normal” pre-crisis 
period the average sensitivity coefficient is not closed to 1, certifying a kind of reduced 
sensitivity of the EM IG portfolio to price changes of the corresponding UST portfolio. The 
Date 
Endurance 
window 
(days) 
(A)
∆ in UST
 1Y price 
change
(B)
∆ in EM IG 
1Y price 
change
 (C)
Sensitivity 
D = C / B
Endurance 
weighted 
sensitivity 
E = A x D
Amplitude 
weighted 
sensitivity 
F = |B| x D
Endurance and 
Amplitude 
weighted sensitivity 
G = A x |B| x D 
03-04-2013
05-07-2013 93 -49,98 -52,51 1,05 97,7 52,5 4883
08-08-2013 34 23,37 -2,42 -0,10 -3,5 -2,4 -82
05-09-2013 28 -21,51 -14,16 0,66 18,4 14,2 396
24-10-2013 49 39,78 28,88 0,73 35,6 28,9 1415
27-12-2013 64 -17,94 5,20 -0,29 -18,5 -5,2 -333
03-02-2014 38 26,43 16,98 0,64 24,4 17,0 645
03-04-2014 59 -18,88 17,61 -0,93 -55,0 -17,6 -1039
25-06-2014 83 51,83 72,50 1,40 116,1 72,5 6017
30-07-2014 35 -12,31 -19,10 1,55 54,3 19,1 669
05-09-2014 37 21,49 18,21 0,85 31,4 18,2 674
06-11-2014 62 -27,69 -40,52 1,46 90,7 40,5 2513
15-01-2015 70 33,83 -16,77 -0,50 -34,7 -16,8 -1174
03-03-2015 47 -36,43 -7,29 0,20 9,4 7,3 343
02-04-2015 30 23,96 5,90 0,25 7,4 5,9 177
18-08-2015 138 -33,29 -34,45 1,03 142,8 34,5 4755
02-10-2015 45 18,14 15,31 0,84 38,0 15,3 689
14-01-2016 104 -38,24 5,12 -0,13 -13,9 -5,1 -533
10-02-2016 27 37,97 8,38 0,22 6,0 8,4 226
25-04-2016 75 -23,51 1,63 -0,07 -5,2 -1,6 -122
27-06-2016 63 37,94 26,30 0,69 43,7 26,3 1657
Total (Average): 
UST gain windows 705 -279,78 -138,49 0,45 0,45 0,49 0,53
Total (Average): 
UST loss windows
476 314,73 173,25 0,50 0,56 0,55 0,63
0,48 0,50 0,52 0,58Sensitivity Averaged over the whole period
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sign of a price response relative of the EM IG portfolio is the same as the sign of the 
“inducing” price change occurred in the portfolio of US government bonds, but amplitude of 
the price response observed in the EM IG portfolio is equal just to 58% of the price change 
relative to UST securities. In other words, a move in the risk-free interest rate is only partially 
passed through to the yield of EM IG bonds.  
 
While comparing EM IG sensitivity averaged over the windows of the positive UST price 
deltas (risk free-rates downtrend intervals), i.e. 0.53, with EM IG sensitivity averaged over 
the windows of the negative UST price deltas (risk free-rates uptrend intervals), i.e. 0.63 we 
could infer that decreases of risk-free interest rates affect EM IG bonds in a weaker manner 
than the increases of risk-free interest rates. In other words, similarly to the “old normal” pre-
crisis period, during the “new normal” post-crisis conditions, the EM IG portfolio also suffers 
from risk-free rate increases more than benefits from risk-free rate decreases. 
 
Figure 25 below represents historic behavior of endurance-times-amplitude weighted 
sensitivity; see the right most column of Table 12. The value of the sensitivity is depicted 
constant for the entire interval along which it was calculated.  
 
 
Figure 25. Price-wise endurance-times-amplitude weighted sensitivity of EM IG portfolio 
along the post-crisis period (03.04.2013 – 27.06.2014). 
 
In this case of the “new normal” post-crisis period the dynamics of the EM IG portfolio 
sensitivity exhibits volatility somewhat superior to the “old normal” pre-crisis period, but 
considerably inferior to the volatility range of the “distressed” through-the-crisis period. The 
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widths of volatility ranges are equal to 1.4, 10.6, and 2.5, respectively; compare Figures 21, 
23, and 25.  
 
Although the sensitivity coefficients values in the case of the “new normal” post-crisis period 
exhibit several positive and also a few positive spikes, this volatility range is centered at the 
positive level of 0.58 certifying that the overall price-wise sensitivity of EM IG portfolio is 
positive though attenuated if compared to the amplitude of “inducing” price changes of UST 
portfolio.  
 
 
4.4.3.2. Post-crisis price-wise interest rate sensitivity of EM HY portfolio 
 
Table 13 represents 20 major moves in the over-1-year price changes during the “new 
normal” post-crisis period (03.04.2013 – 26.06.2016). For each of these 20 time windows we 
calculate the corresponding 1-year price change deltas for both, the UST and EM HY 
modeled portfolios. We also present the respective sensitivity coefficient calculated as the 
ratio of the value change delta observed in the EM HY portfolio to the “inducing” value 
change delta observed in the UST portfolio. For informative purposes we present our 
calculations of arithmetic average, endurance window weighted average, amplitude weighted 
average and endurance-times-amplitude weighted average of sensitivity coefficients. These 
values are averaged over three different aggregated arrays of the windows; the aggregate 
array of the UST positive deltas, the aggregate array of the UST negative deltas, and for the 
entire span of the “new normal” post-crisis interval. 
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Table 13. Price-wise IR sensitivity of EM HY bonds along the post-crisis period. 
 
As could be seen in the right-most column of Table 13, the endurance-times-amplitudes 
weighted sensitivity of EM HY portfolio averaged over the whole “new normal” post-crisis 
period (03.04.2013 – 26.06.2016), is equal to 0.22. Differently to the “old normal” pre-crisis 
period the average sensitivity coefficient is rather closed to 0 than to 1, certifying a kind of 
quite a weak sensitivity of the EM HY portfolio to price changes of the corresponding UST 
portfolio. The sign of a price response relative of the EM HY portfolio is the same as the sign 
of the “inducing” price change occurred in the portfolio of US government bonds, but 
amplitude of the price response observed in the EM HY portfolio is equal to just 22% of the 
price change relative to UST securities. In other words, less than one quarter of a move in the 
risk-free interest rate is passed through to the yield of EM HY bonds. 
 
While comparing EM HY sensitivity averaged over the windows of the positive UST price 
deltas (risk free-rates downtrend intervals), i.e. 0.14, with EM HY sensitivity averaged over 
Date 
Endurance 
window 
(days) 
(A)
∆ in UST
 1Y price 
change
(B)
∆ in EM HY 
1Y price 
change
 (C)
Sensitivity 
D = C / B
Endurance 
weighted 
sensitivity 
E = A x D
Amplitude 
weighted 
sensitivity 
F = |B| x D
Endurance and 
Amplitude 
weighted sensitivity 
G = A x |B| x D 
03-04-2013
05-07-2013 93 -49,98 -72,22 1,45 134,4 72,2 6717
08-08-2013 34 23,37 -8,95 -0,38 -13,0 -8,9 -304
05-09-2013 28 -21,51 -23,13 1,08 30,1 23,1 648
24-10-2013 49 39,78 12,86 0,32 15,8 12,9 630
27-12-2013 64 -17,94 5,20 -0,29 -18,6 -5,2 -333
03-02-2014 38 26,43 3,71 0,14 5,3 3,7 141
03-04-2014 59 -18,88 20,97 -1,11 -65,5 -21,0 -1237
25-06-2014 83 51,83 101,21 1,95 162,1 101,2 8401
30-07-2014 35 -12,31 -24,69 2,01 70,2 24,7 864
05-09-2014 37 21,49 13,32 0,62 22,9 13,3 493
06-11-2014 62 -27,69 -41,81 1,51 93,6 41,8 2592
15-01-2015 70 33,83 -57,74 -1,71 -119,5 -57,7 -4042
03-03-2015 47 -36,43 33,17 -0,91 -42,8 -33,2 -1559
02-04-2015 30 23,96 8,98 0,37 11,2 9,0 269
18-08-2015 138 -33,29 -14,73 0,44 61,1 14,7 2033
02-10-2015 45 18,14 -27,52 -1,52 -68,3 -27,5 -1238
14-01-2016 104 -38,24 54,09 -1,41 -147,1 -54,1 -5625
10-02-2016 27 37,97 -14,77 -0,39 -10,5 -14,8 -399
25-04-2016 75 -23,51 13,67 -0,58 -43,6 -13,7 -1025
27-06-2016 63 37,94 21,29 0,56 35,4 21,3 1341
Total (Average): 
UST gain windows
705 -279,78 -49,50 0,22 0,10 0,18 0,14
Total (Average): 
UST loss windows
476 314,73 52,40 0,00 0,09 0,17 0,33
0,11 0,10 0,17 0,22Sensitivity Averaged over the whole period
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the windows of the negative UST price deltas (risk free-rates uptrend intervals), i.e. 0.33 we 
could infer that decreases of risk-free interest rates affect EM HY bonds in a much weaker 
manner than the increases of risk-free interest rates. In other words, similarly to the “old 
normal” pre-crisis period, during the “new normal” post-crisis conditions, the EM HY 
portfolio also suffers from risk-free rate increases significantly more than benefits from risk-
free rate decreases. 
 
Figure 26 below represents historic behavior of endurance-times-amplitude weighted 
sensitivity; see the right most column of Table 13. The value of the sensitivity is depicted 
constant for the entire interval along which it was calculated.  
 
 
 
Figure 26. Price-wise endurance-times-amplitude weighted sensitivity of EM HY portfolio 
along the post-crisis period (03.04.2013 – 27.06.2014). 
 
In this case of the “new normal” post-crisis period the dynamics of the EM HY portfolio 
sensitivity exhibits volatility somewhat inferior to the “old normal” pre-crisis period, but 
considerably inferior to the volatility range of the “distressed” through-the-crisis period. The 
widths of volatility ranges are equal to 7.0, 26.4, and 3.7, respectively; compare Figures 22, 
24, and 26. On the other hand, during the “new normal” post-crisis period the range of EM 
HY volatility -1.7 – 2.0 remains somewhat wider than the range observed in the case of the 
EM IG portfolio: -0.9 – 1.6, see Figures 25 and 26.    
 
Although the sensitivity coefficients values in the case of the “new normal” post-crisis period 
exhibit several positive and also a few positive spikes, this volatility range is centered at the 
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positive level of 0.22 certifying that the overall price-wise sensitivity of EM HT portfolio is 
positive though strongly attenuated if compared to the amplitude of “inducing” price changes 
of UST portfolio.  
 
 
5. Discussions and implications 
 
5.1. Binary behavior of price-wise interest rate sensitivity of EM bond portfolios 
 
The novelty of our research resides in a fact that to the best of our knowledge we are unaware 
of any other study focused on interest rate sensitivity in terms of asset prices 
appreciation/depreciation over rather long - annual, biannual, and triennial periods. We argue 
that such approach makes all the sense from the point of view of portfolio risk management, 
but seemingly the difficulty always was to have an aggregate price data. We overcame this 
difficulty by recalculating average prices of modeled portfolios from the available blended 
yield indexes following our newly developed proprietary methodology. Fortunately, our 
approach permitted us to uncover a phenomenon of a binary behavior of price-wise interest 
rate sensitivity.  
 
Below we present the detailed discussion of price-wise interest rate sensitivity per type of 
credit quality, IG and HY. Than we analyze negative and positive sensitivities in terms of 
responses of credit spreads to risk free rates. We also propose a plausible solution to an old 
controversy, namely between Merton´s model (1974) implying in negative responses and 
Kamin and Kleist approach (1999) resulting in positive responses of credit spreads to risk 
free rates, each of which is reportedly supported by diverse empirical observations. 
 
 
5.1.1. Price-wise interest-rate sensitivity of IG EM corporate bond portfolios 
 
Investigating the asset sensitivity to interest rate from the point of view of asset price changes 
allows us to present a few detailed and comprehensive conclusions. Figure 27 demonstrate 
the three different regimes of price-wise sensitivity of EM IG corporate bonds. 
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Figure 27. Regimes of price-wise IR sensitivity of EM IG corporate bonds 
 
The pre-crisis period (01.01.2004 – 13.07.2007) and the post-crisis period (03.04.2013 – 
31.12.2015) or, respectively, the “old normal” and the “new normal” regimes exhibit 
different kind of relation between price changes of EM IG and UST portfolios in comparison 
to the “distressed” through-the-crisis regime (13.07.2007 – 03.04.2013). Under the “normal” 
regime, Figure 27 attests that the variations in the present value of the modeled EM IG 
portfolio represent positive correlation with the variations in the present value of the modeled 
UST portfolio, as the respective price-change lines move closely and jointly within the 
“normal” regime intervals. On the contrary, along the “distressed” regime interval the 
sensitivity sign changes from the positive to negative: the changes in the present values of 
the portfolios composed by risk-free and risky assets behave in an opposite mode.   
 
Another interesting feature to be observed is that under the “old normal” regime prior to the 
crisis (01.01.2004 – 13.07.2007) the EM IG portfolio price changes are related to the UST 
portfolio price changes roughly as 1 to 1. In Section 4.4 we presented the quantitative 
confirmation of this qualitative finding. The sensitivity ratio averaged over this period is 
found to be 0.96 to 1.  Figure 28 illustrates the dynamics of EM IG and UST asset price 
changes under the pre-crisis “old normal” regime in more detail. 
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Figure 28. The pre-crisis “old normal” regime: 1-year price changes relative to the EM IG 
and UST portfolios.   
 
As could be seen, the price responses of the EM IG model portfolio closely mirror the 
inductive price changes of the respective US government bonds portfolio. 
 
On the other hand, under the “new normal” regime posterior to the crisis (03.04.2013 – 
31.12.2015) for EM IG corporate bonds, we also observe positive although somewhat 
reduced price-wise sensitivity. The sensitivity ratio averaged over this period is found to be 
0.58 to 1, which is about 60% of the pre-crisis figure. Figure 29 illustrates the dynamics of 
price changes under the post-crisis “new normal” regime in more detail. 
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Figure 29. The post-crisis “new normal” regime: 1-year price changes relative to the EM IG 
and UST portfolios.   
 
 
Still we could state that under the “new normal” regime IG bonds price changes exhibit 
positive average sensitivity to price changes of the respective UST bond portfolio, even 
though the respective price-change lines move not so closely and jointly as within the “old 
normal” pre-crisis period. 
 
This situation changes completely and we observe negative price-wise sensitivity if the 
analyzed period spans over financial turmoil preceding and following the apogee of the 
global financial crisis. Under the “distressed” through-the-crisis regime (13.07.2007 – 
03.04.2013), the sensitivity of the EM IG portfolio price changes to the UST portfolio price 
changes is rather complex and varies along the period. In Figure 27 we see that the volatility 
band for the EM IG price changes is 2.5 times larger than the respective UST volatility band. 
As could also be seen in Figure 27 for several time intervals within the “distressed” regime 
period, the impact of the risk free interest rate changes on EM IG bonds is inverted and 
amplified, while for other time intervals is amplified but not inverted.  
 
Still these two kinds of amplified responses with different signs, if averaged over the entire 
“distressed” period damp one another with the predominance remaining on the side of 
negative sensitivity. The EM IG to UST sensitivity averaged over the “distressed” period is 
found to be -0.53 to 1, see Section 4.4.2.1. It means that in this case we could even propose 
using the term “anti-sensitivity” to highlight such inverted relation when on average a price 
increase in the UST portfolio leads to a price decrease in the EM IG portfolio and vice versa. 
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Note, that sensitivity ratio of -0.53 indicates that on average within the “distressed” period 
the amplitude of EM IG portfolio price response is attenuated as it equals roughly to one half 
of the amplitude of the inductive price change of the UST portfolio.  
 
 
5.1.2. Price-wise interest-rate sensitivity of HY EM corporate bond portfolios 
 
The conceptual analysis of the previous Subsection 5.1.1 still holds for the EM HY to UST 
price-wise sensitivity as could be inferred from Figure 30 below.  
 
 
Figure 30. Regimes of price-wise IR sensitivity of EM HY corporate bonds 
 
But as HY securities are riskier than IG securities and hence embed more pronounced 
idiosyncratic features of the obligors, the EM HY bond portfolio shows different degrees of 
price-wise interest rate sensitivity in comparison to EM IG bond portfolio; compare the 
vertical scales in Figures 27 and 30.  
 
Similarly to the EM IG case, under the “normal” regime prior to the crisis (01.01.2004 – 
13.07.2007) the EM HY portfolio price changes are related to the corresponding UST 
portfolio price changes roughly as 1 to 1. The sensitivity ratio averaged over this period is 
found to be 0.96 to 1, the same as in EM IG case. Figure 31 the dynamics of EM HY and 
UST asset price changes under the pre-crisis “old normal” regime in more detail. 
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Figure 31. The pre-crisis “old normal” regime: 1-year price changes relative to the EM HY 
and UST portfolios.   
 
As could be seen, the price responses of the EM HY model portfolio also mirror the inductive 
price changes of the respective US government bonds portfolio, although not so closely as in 
the case of EM IG debt. 
 
On the other hand, under the “new normal” regime posterior to the crisis (03.04.2013 – 
31.12.2015) for EM HY corporate bonds, we observe only slightly positive price-wise 
sensitivity. The sensitivity ratio averaged over this period is found to be 0.22 to 1, which 
indicates that in this case we should rather talk about insensitivity than about sensitivity to 
changes in the yields of risk-free assets, as on average only 22% of a price change in UST 
portfolio is passed through to the price of EM HY portfolio. Figure 32 illustrates the dynamics 
of price changes under the post-crisis “new normal” regime in more detail. 
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Figure 32. The post-crisis “new normal” regime: 1-year price changes relative to the EM 
HY and UST portfolios.   
 
Still we could state that under the “new normal” regime HY bonds price changes exhibit 
positive average sensitivity to price changes of the respective UST bond portfolio, even 
though the behavior of the respective lines is not very similar.  
 
One again, similarly to the EM IG case, if the analyzed period spans over financial turmoil 
preceding and following the apogee of the global financial crisis, in the EM HY case we also 
observe negative price-wise sensitivity. Under the “distressed” through-the-crisis regime 
(13.07.2007 – 03.04.2013), the sensitivity of the EM HY portfolio price changes to the UST 
portfolio price changes is rather complex and varies along the period. In Figure 30 we see 
that the volatility band for the EM HY price changes is 6 times larger than the respective 
UST volatility band. As could also be seen from Figure 30 for several time intervals within 
the “distressed” regime the impact of the risk-free interest rate changes on EM HY bonds is 
inverted and amplified, while for other time intervals is amplified but not inverted.  
 
Still these two kinds of amplified responses with different signs, if averaged over the whole 
“distressed” period, damp one another with the strong predominance remaining on the side 
of negative sensitivity. The EM HY to UST sensitivity averaged over the “distressed” period 
is found to be -1.76 to 1. It means that in this case we also could propose using the term “anti-
sensitivity” to highlight such inverted relation when on average a price increase in the UST 
portfolio leads to a price decrease in the EM HY portfolio and vice versa. Note, that 
sensitivity ratio of -1.76 indicates that on average within the “distressed” period the amplitude 
of EM IG portfolio price response is amplified as it equals 176% of the amplitude of the 
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inductive price change of the UST portfolio. Thus, under “distressed” regime the absolute 
values of the sensitivity coefficient for HY bonds are superior to the sensitivity coefficients 
for IG bonds.  
 
So, as in the EM IG case, for EM HY debt we observe positive and negative sensitivities for 
“normal” regime (01.01.2004 – 13.07.2007; 03.04.2013 – 31.12.2015) and “distressed” 
regime (13.07.2007 – 03.04.2013), respectively. In other words, for both, EM IG and EM 
HY debt we evidence a kind of binary behavior of price-wise interest rate sensitivity. 
 
 
5.1.3. Negative and positive sensitivities and responses of credit spreads to risk-free rates 
 
In our work, negative responses of credit spread to risk-free rates are especially well 
evidenced for the “distressed” through-the-crisis regime. In this case the amplitude of the 
credit spread narrowing (widening) is even superior to the amplitude of the increase 
(decrease) of risk-free interest rate. We infer it from the fact that during this “distressed” 
period we observe negative price-wise sensitivity for both, IG and HY EM bonds. It means 
that the yields of risky and risk-free assets move in the opposite directions. As for HY EM 
bonds the amplitude of the negative price-wise sensitivity is amplified while for IG EM bonds 
the amplitude of the negative price-wise sensitivity is dumped, the opposite moves for HY 
bonds yields is stronger. Thus, for the distressed “regime” we evidence that HY bonds show 
more negative relation of credit spreads to interest rates. Thus, we consider that our results 
corroborate with the findings of Dupoyet et al (2016). For 1973 – 2014 time interval Dupoyet 
and coauthors state that HY bonds show more negative relation of credit spreads to interest 
rates, than IG bonds do.  
 
But conceptually our message goes far beyond the statement made above. Our results also 
make us to call the attention that it is very important to relate the observed sensitivities to the 
general risk-on/risk-off regime of the markets, as it could influence the sign, i.e. direction, 
and the strength of sensitivities. For example, for the second half of 2014 (within the “new 
normal” post-crisis period) we observe average price-wise sensitivity of EM HY portfolio of 
1.52 to 1. This evidence that for certain periods, the increases (decreases) in risk free interest 
rates could worsen (improve) creditworthiness of issuers. For EM HY case, we also observe 
a few intervals of both, interest rate increases and decreases, with positive sensitivities above 
1 within the “distressed” crisis period.  
 
On the other hand, for EM IG case within the “distressed” crisis period, positive sensitivities 
above 1 are observed only for periods of increases in risk-free interest rates, meaning that the 
increases in risk-free interest rate could worsen the creditworthiness of EM IG issuers, while 
the improvement in the creditworthiness of EM IG issuers due to eventual decreases in risk-
free interest rates usually is unlikely. Under the “normal condition the situation is different 
as for EM IG case, we also observe, as for EM HY case, a few intervals of both, interest rate 
increases and decreases, with positive sensitivities above 1.  
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One again it is worth noting, that as it is discussed in Section 4.4, for both EM HY and EM 
IG we observe average positive price-wise sensitivities under the “normal” regime 
(01.01.2004 – 13.07.2007; 03.04.2013 – 31.12.2015) and average negative price-wise 
sensitivities under the “distressed” regime (13.07.2007 – 03.04.2013). Thus, for both types 
of analyzed EM corporates we evidence a phenomenon of a binary behavior of price-wise 
interest rate sensitivity, and hence a binary behavior of credit spread reactions to changes in 
risk-free interest rates.  
 
 
5.1.4. Solution of an old controversy: Merton´s model vs Kamin and Kleist approach 
 
Based on the observed binary behavior of interest rate sensitivities we decided to revisit an 
old controversy, namely between structural Merton´s model, Merton (1974),  resulting in 
negative relation of credit spreads to interest rates, and Kamin and Kleist approach, Kamin 
and Kleist (1999),  which posits that changes in risk-free interest rates are passed through to 
yields of risky assets with the same or even amplified amplitude, and hence resulting in 
positive relation of credit spreads to interest rates. Kamin and Kleist (1999) in fact published 
their empirical findings for EM bonds supporting their theoretical thinking. On the other hand 
the negative relation of credit spreads to interest rates was observed in many recent research, 
see, for example, Boulkeroua & Stark (2013), Neal et al (2015), and Dupoyet et al (2016). 
These empirical studies corroborate with Merton´s model. 
 
For all the three periods analyzed in our research, i.e. the “old normal” regime (01.01.2004 – 
13.07.2007), “distressed” regime (13.07.2007 – 03.04.2013), and the “new normal” regime 
(03.04.2013 – 31.12.2015) our results evidence that for different periods different models 
provide better fit with our empirical findings. For instance, for the “old normal” period the 
price-wise sensitivity for both IG and HY portfolios equals 1 to 1. Thus, this is consistent 
with theoretical thinking of Kamin and Kleist (1999), as it predicts mostly positive response 
of credit spreads to risk free interest rates, as posits that the probability of default is not 
affected by changes in the risk-free interest rate, which we believe is true for normal 
economic conditions. 
 
On the contrary for the “distressed” regime (13.07.2007 – 03.04.2013), negative sensitivity 
values are observed for both IG and HY EM corporate debt portfolios. This result is clearly 
in line with Merton´s model which implies a negative response of credit spreads to interest 
rates, i.e. it means that the probability of default is affected by changes in the risk-free interest 
rate which is clearly the case in times of financial turmoil. Further on, in Section 5.2 we 
present a theoretical explanation of the observed behavior. 
 
In respect to the “new normal” regime (03.04.2013 – 31.12.2015) we posit that the “new 
normal” post-crisis regime is situated somewhere in between of the “old normal” regime with 
positive 1 to 1 sensitivities and the “distressed” regimes, with negative sensitivities. Still as 
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we demonstrated, on average this regime is closer to fully recovered “old normal” than to the 
“distressed” conditions, as this “normal” post-crisis regime is characterized by positive price-
wise interest rate sensitivities.  
 
Thus we infer that the “new normal” post-crisis period could be successfully described by 
each of the models or by the mix of them both. According to the Merton´s model in the case 
of the “new normal” the probability of default is affected by changes in the risk-free interest 
rate, but less than under the “distressed” conditions.  
 
On the other hand in terms of Kamin and Kleist approach we could talk about partial 
transmission of changes in interest rates to yields of risky securities. In other words, under 
the “new normal” conditions, changes in risk-free interest rates are passed through to yields 
of risky assets not with the same but with the reduced or damped amplitude. In a certain way 
this comprehensive amendment to their original theoretical arguments, allows to apply 
Kamin and Kleist approach for explaining all the range of positive sensitivity coefficients, 
i.e. with values between 0 and 1. 
 
We also highlight perils of long run averaging, as such algorithms present considerable risks 
to “throw the baby out with the bathwater”. This is so because averaging sensitivities over a 
long run could disguise the observable effects as spanning the window of observations over 
both, the “normal” market regime with positive sensitivity and the “distressed” market 
regime with negative sensitivity, one could occasionally find himself observing on average 
only one of them, the predominant one, but damped by the other. Fig. 21 below provides a 
conceptual illustration of this point in terms of yields and spreads behavior. 
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Figure 21. Negative and positive responses of credit spreads to interest rate under distressed 
and normal regimes, respectively.  
 
 
Eventually, depending on the span of the window over the two regimes one even could 
observe insensitivity to interest rate, meaning that on average the sensitivity of one sign 
observed along certain intervals is damped to zero by the other sign sensitivity observed along 
the rest of the observation window. So it makes us doubt in a meaningfulness of the findings 
of Dupoyet et al (2016) as this paper reports consistent negative relation between credit 
spread and interest rates observed over quite a long period 1973-2014. Our research proves 
that it is not always the case, at least for the analyzed EM corporate portfolios along the years 
2002-2015, especially as we observe several time intervals with positive price-wise 
sensitivities above 1. And once again, the long run averaging is capable of hiding time 
variation in sensitivities among the constituent short run intervals.  
 
 
5.2. Interest rate sensitivity of EM bond portfolios in relation to phases of business cycles 
 
Based on our analysis we proposed an explanation for both positive and negative price-wise 
interest rate sensitivities of the EM portfolios observed along changing economic 
conjuncture.  
 
The novelty of our approach resides in the fact that positive price-wise interest rate 
sensitivities we ascribe to “normal” regime of sustainable economic growth, while negative 
price-wise interest rate sensitivities we attribute to both crisis-related turmoil phases, the 
preceding financial downturn and post-crisis recovery.  
 
 
5.2.1. “Normal” regime 
 
Under the “normal” regime, the sensitivity of price changes observed in the EM corporate 
debt portfolios to the UST portfolios price changes is positive. It means that the ups and 
downs in the risk-free interest rate are passed through to the respective bond yields practically 
unchanged (pre-crisis period) or attenuated (post-crisis period). For both, IG and HY EM 
portfolios, we posit that moderate and not abrupt increases and decreases in the risk-free 
interest rate do not affect the level of corporate creditworthiness if considered from the 
operations point of view. This is especially true under the “old normal” pre-crisis regime, as 
for both, the EM IG and HY portfolios, the price responses are related to the inducing price 
changes in the corresponding UST portfolio roughly as 1 to 1.   
 
Under the “new normal” post-crisis regime, on average, the price changes of the UST 
portfolios are not passed through to EM portfolios entirely as they result in the responses of 
reduced amplitude. We attribute this behavior to the not yet completed transition from the 
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“distressed” risk-off crisis-related phase with negative sensitivities to the fully recovered 
conditions of risk-on “normal” phase with positive 1 to 1 sensitivities.   
 
During crises, the increases in risk-free interest rates are interpreted by market participants 
as recovery indicators for economic conditions. Thus, the negative average sensitivities are 
observed. Such increases in risk-free interest rates reduce the risk of default. The lower 
creditworthiness of an issuer, the stronger is the narrowing of the issuer´s credit spread. It is 
consistent with the fact, that for the “distressed” crisis period we observed -0.53 to 1 for the 
EM IG portfolio and -1.76 to 1 for the EM HY portfolio.  
 
In any case we could say that this phase is not quite idiosyncratic, as usually it is characterized 
as “risk-off” meaning that generally speaking there is no risk appetite in the market. No one 
seems to be interested in idiosyncratic features of issuers and all attention is centered at risk-
free interest rate behavior. Thus, this phase in fact is interest rate centered. One of the main 
drivers during the “distressed” period was a level of UST yield at 10 year points in the term 
structure. Credit spreads depended strongly on the level of risk-free rates. Changes in risk 
free-rates were negatively correlated with credit spreads. “Anti-sensitivities” were observed.   
 
Under fully recovered economic conditions, the increases in risk-free interest rates are passed 
through to the respective bond yields being practically unchanged. The observed positive 
average sensitivities are approximately 1 to 1. It means that market participants interpret the 
creditworthiness of the issuers as not depending on risk-free interest rate, and hence the 
present value of securities for different credit quality in fact is affected in the very same way; 
through the discount factor. Once again all attention is centered at risk-free interest rate 
behavior. During the “old normal” pre-crisis period, the slope of the government bonds yield 
curve was is the center of investors´ attention.  Thus, this phase in fact is also interest rate 
centered, but with opposite impacts if compared to the “distressed” period. Positive 1 to 1 
sensitivities are observed.  
 
We posit that the “new normal” post-crisis regime is situated somewhere in between of the 
fully recovered interest rate centered economic conditions with positive sensitivities and the 
“distressed” also interest rate centered economic conditions, but with negative sensitivities. 
Still as we demonstrated, on average this regime is closer to fully recovered than to the 
“distressed” conditions, as this “normal” post-crisis regime is characterized by positive price-
wise sensitivities. In a certain way it is quite an intuitive conclusion, as passing from 
significantly negative to significantly positive sensitivities, we are close to insensitivity or 
attenuated positive sensitivity.  
 
Although under these “new normal” post-crisis conditions credit spreads are influenced in 
some way by inflation expectations, in fact we could state that this phase is not interest rate 
centered, but rather major attention of market participants is focused on idiosyncratic features 
of issuers. The sensitivity ratio averaged over this period is found to be 0.58 to 1 for EM IG 
and 0.22 to 1 for EM HY bond portfolios. Thus, we could conclude that creditworthiness of 
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issuers is only partially improved by the increase in risk-free interest rates: the stronger are 
idiosyncratic factors (EM HY), the more insensitive is portfolio under these “new normal” 
post-crisis conditions to changes in risk-free interest rates.  
 
If considered from the operations point of view, under the “new normal” post-crisis regime 
the creditworthiness both of IG and HY EM issuers benefits, although to different degree, 
from increases in risk-free interest rate. For the sake of comparison, under the “old normal” 
pre-crisis regime the creditworthiness both of IG and HY EM issuers was not affected at all 
by increases/decreases in risk-free interest rate, as posited by Kamin and Kleist approach. 
 
We ascribe such “normal” regime of interest rate sensitivity to periods of rather sustainable 
growth, i.e., growth that is not stimulated by non-conventional policy measures (and is not 
fueled by any apparent boom of bubble creation resulting in practices of “panic” buying and 
inflated prices of certain types of assets). Discussing geographically diversified EM 
portfolios we certainly refer to global economic growth. Still, we argue that our reasoning 
also holds for IG and HY assets in isolated geographies selected on a regional and/or country 
basis. 
 
 
5.2.2. “Distressed” regime 
 
Let us discuss now the negative price-wise sensitivities of EM portfolios observed under the 
“distressed” regime. We consider the “distressed” regime to span over the two consecutive 
phases: deterioration and recovery of economic conditions. In other words, in respect to the 
recent history, those phases are the crisis development and recuperation from the crisis lowest 
low. We could also think of “distressed” regime as of a passage through a bust of a bubble to 
the economic bottom and then back to the economy as usual.   
 
 
5.2.2.1. “Distressed” regime during downturn  
 
During the vicious cycle of a recession, markets enter into the risk-off mode and the risk-free 
rate behavior exhibits a downtrend dynamics due to the increasing demand for the safe assets. 
Additionally, central banks in a recession adopt a policy of reducing interest rates in order to 
stimulate the investment necessary to repair economic conditions. Hence, a recession makes 
yields on risk-free assets drop and price increases are registered in portfolios consisting of 
US Treasury securities. 
 
In parallel, the worsening of global economy augments the credit risk of the EM corporates 
through several mechanisms. From an operations point of view, business conditions in 
recession get worse due to the lower demand for product and services as uncertainty 
increases. Regarding the financial side of businesses, it is worth mentioning deterioration in 
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companies´ abilities to service their debt and obtain external financing due to worsening 
economic conditions. Financing costs keep growing.  
 
Under such conditions there is a lot of uncertainty in the market.  The demand for safe UST 
securities causes their yields to drop and prices to rise. Simultaneously, as a result of flight-
to-quality phenomena, see Gubareva and Borges 2016, investors withdraw their funds from 
riskier EM corporate bonds. Thus, the yields on corporate bonds rise and the prices drop. 
Hence we observe the situation when risk-free rates are falling, but the credit spreads for 
risky corporate bonds is widening.  
 
The increase in default risk, provoked by the above-mentioned factors, makes credit spreads 
for corporate bonds get wider in such a manner that yields on risk assets grow even though 
yields on risk-free assets drop and, hence, prices decreases are observed in risky EM 
portfolios. So, price-wise interest rate sensitivity of EM assets, in particular, and of risky 
assets, in general, reveals itself as negative under the downturn bust or deterioration of 
economic conditions.  
 
Summarizing the point, when interest rates are decreasing, the credit premia are rising, but 
the credit spreads widening overtakes the drop in the risk-free yields. That is nothing but a 
well-known flight-to-quality phenomenon described through the prism of economic 
environment. This phenomenon results in price-driven losses suffered by risky asset 
portfolios accompanied by price-driven gains of portfolios composed by the US treasury 
instruments. 
 
 
5.2.2.2. “Distressed” regime during recovery  
 
During the recovery from a flight-to-quality, i.e., during a “flight-from-quality”, markets 
enter into the risk-on mode. In such periods of economic expansion, the demand for the safe 
assets drops, causing the risk-free interest rate rise. As central banks usually do not raise rates 
when large number of corporations and firms might have difficulties to service their debt, 
they normally try to raise rate when the economic conditions are recovering. Under such 
conditions central banks are potentially more likely to adhere to the tightening of monetary 
policy by increasing interest rates. As the economy recovers interest rate increases could even 
become necessary to avoid the overheating of the economy and keep inflation under control. 
In sum, yields on risk-free assets increase and price-driven losses are registered in UST 
portfolios. 
  
Simultaneously, this economic recovery results in a decrease in the corporate default risk. 
From an operations point of view, corporations start to benefit from improved consumer 
confidence, augmented demand, and reduced uncertainty. Financing risk and costs also 
decrease. As a result, on average credit spreads of corporate bonds tighten in such a manner 
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that yields on risk assets drop even though yields on risk-free assets grow and, hence, price-
driven gains occur in risky EM portfolios. 
 
So, price-wise interest rate sensitivity of EM assets, in particular, and of risky assets, in 
general, remains negative during the phase of recovery from crisis too.  
 
Wrapping up, when risk-free interest rates are increasing, the credit premia are declining, but 
the credit spreads are narrowing faster than the risk-free yields are climbing. That is nothing 
but a recovery from a well-known flight-to-quality phenomenon described through the prism 
of economic environment.  This “flight-from-quality” phenomenon results in price-driven 
gains experienced by risky asset portfolios accompanied by price-driven losses of portfolios 
composed by the US treasury instruments. 
 
So, only for the “distressed” regime, to which we attribute pre-recession and post recession 
phase of business cycles, our research is in line with results of Dupoyet et al (2016), which 
state that the average change in interest rates (credit spreads) is negative (positive) during 
periods of recession while the average change in interest rates (credit spreads) is positive 
(negative) during periods of economic expansion. But for us the periods of economic 
expansion referred in the cited research seem to be rather the periods of recovery from 
economic cycle lows. We evidence and state that the negative relations between interest rates 
and credit spreads disappear and turn to positive relations for both, IG and HY, EM 
corporates under the “normal” regime which we ascribed to the period of moderate 
sustainable growth present in any business cycle after the recovery from the preceding 
recession but prior to boom and consecutive bust leading to the next downturn.  
 
 
5.3. Additional Considerations  
 
It is quite intuitive that interest rates for different types of bonds are not expected to change 
by the same degree in response to moves in risk free interest rates. In this way, our results 
also corroborate with the findings of Boulkeroua and Stark (2013), observing that interest 
rate sensitivities vary across ratings categories. In our case for the EM HY portfolios we 
observe weaker positive sensitivities under the “normal” regime and stronger negative 
sensitivities under the “distressed” regime than for the EM IG portfolios.  
 
So now we need to address the question we tried to answer.  At the end, does it make an 
economic sense to hedge interest risk of U.S. dollar denominated EM corporate debt by short 
positions in U.S. Treasury bonds or by pay-fixed receive-float interest rate swaps? As we 
have evidenced by our results, such hedge makes sense only over the periods of moderate 
sustainable growth. On the contrary, to hedge against downside risk in times of economic 
turmoil, as suggested by our findings, it is advisable to augment exposure to IRR, for example 
by contracting pay-float receive fixed IRS. In sum, we argue that the hedging of IRR and 
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downside risk should not be mechanical, but ought to be a dynamic process linked to phases 
of business cycles.    
 
 
6. Conclusion 
 
In this research, we develop the proprietary framework to assess an interest rate sensitivity 
of corporate bond portfolios based on blended yield indexes. We apply our model approach 
to two types of EM corporates: IG and HY securities. Our research advances well beyond the 
correlation analyses and even beyond the widely performed studies of the relation between 
interest rates and credit spreads as we investigated the impact in present value of the modeled 
portfolios. Our approach addresses interest risk sensitivity from the point of view of the 
medium long term investment, and thus the investment horizons modeled here vary between 
one and three years.  
 
We do consider that our framework presents a promising potential. Our results are innovative 
and convincing in a sense that in fact the relation between spreads and interest rate could 
serve only as guidance toward what it would look like the bottom line of real portfolios, while 
our approach is focused on the proper present value of the portfolios, i.e., on what matters at 
the very end. Thus our quantification of sensitivities is quite meaningful from the point of 
view of the interest rate risk hedging and downside risk management.   
 
The historical span of our research covers the period 2002-2015, which enables us to assess 
interest rate sensitivity of assets during the development, apogee, and aftermath of the recent 
global financial and economic crisis. The results presented in this paper contrast with the 
result of previous empirical work and their theoretical interpretations, as previously both 
expansion and contraction phases of business cycle were used to explain negative responses 
of credit spreads to interest rates. In our research we explicitly indicate that the phase of a 
moderate sustainable growth can explain the observed positive relation between credit 
spreads and interest rates.  
 
We have proved and documented an empirical evidence of a binary behavior of interest rate 
sensitivity along phases of business cycles. Under the “normal” pre-crisis and post-crisis 
regimes, which we ascribe to the periods of a moderate sustainable growth, the changes in 
the present value of EM portfolios the positively related to the changes in present values of 
UST bond portfolios. Resulting sensitivity is positive. On the other hand, under the 
“distressed” through-the-crisis regime, which we ascribe to the phases spanned over an entry 
to and exit form a recession, the changes in the present value of EM portfolios are negatively 
related to the changes in present values of UST bond portfolios. Under such conditions 
sensitivity is negative. This suggests that the hedging of downside risk ought to be a dynamic 
process linked to phases of business cycles.  
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Our approach permitted us to solve an old controversy between Merton´s (1974) structural 
model advocating the influence of interest rate on creditworthiness of obligors and Kamin 
and Kleist (1999) approach arguing that changes in the risk-free rates are passed through 
entirely or even augmented to the yields of risky assets. We demonstrated that for the phases 
of a moderate sustainable growth the sensitivity is positive and that the latter approach fits 
better our empirical observations while during the distressed conditions the Merton´s (1974) 
model provides the theoretical explanation of the observed negative sensitivities. Thus the 
clue to the solution of the controversy resides in a binary behavior of interest rate sensitivities 
of risky assets “privileging” either one or another models along the economic time scale.  
 
Performing numerical quantification of interest rate sensitivities along the available history 
of data, we clearly detected three diverse regimes of sensitivity behavior relative to EM 
corporate debt, which are the “old normal” pre-crisis regime, the “distressed” through-the-
crisis” regime, and the “new normal” post-crisis regime. The respective sensitivities are the 
positive 1 to 1 sensitivity, the negative, i.e. inverted sensitivity, and positive but weaker 
sensitivity of present value of EM corporates to changes in prices of risk-free governmental 
bonds. 
 
Examining behavior of asset sensitivity to interest rate along phases of the recent business 
cycles we corroborate with our idea presented in previous research that an integrated 
treatment of the IRR and credit risk potentially allows for optimizing ECAP of banks and 
financial institutions. This research represents a contribution to the advancement of the 
discussion on the EM cross-geographies alignment of the Pillar 2 methodologies under Basel 
III capital accord.  
 
Looking ahead, we can affirm that the applicability of the developed herein index-based 
framework to gauge interest rate sensitivity is considerably wider than the corporate debt of 
EM. Depending on availability of yield indexes and price indexes, it can be applied to diverse 
portfolios containing fixed income assets from diverse geographies, sectors and security 
rating categories. Thus, further research in this field is highly desirable for positively 
impacting overall efficiency of financial system. It potentially allows financial institutions to 
improve their risk assessment and ECAP management.  
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